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No Imagination: The Marginal Role of
Narrative in Corporate Law
MAE KUYKENDALLt
PREFACE
Though the public has at times been intrigued by spectacular
villains, economic power holders rarely attract the attention of
poets, playwrights, or novelists. The Venetian trader Antonio is
not a great figure in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice.
Countinghouse men and entrepreneurs are occasionally depicted
in Victorian and Edwardian writing-one must remember John
Galsworthy-but these are exceptions. As a rule, businessmen and
financial and economic statesmen receive notice and are dealt with
only when they are associated with high political events and
figures. Literature has always preoccupied itself with the
personality of emperors, kings, princes, and generals. Skipping the
middle position of economics and business, it today interests itself
in the poor, the neglected, the rejected .... So we must treat of
economic power without heroes, observing it for what it is,
wondering, rather than describing, what effect it may have on the
men who hold it.1
t Professor of Law, Michigan State University. I presented a talk based on this
Article at a panel of the International Conference on Narrative, sponsored by
the Society for the Study of Narrative Literature and co-sponsored by
Georgetown University, on March 16, 2007. I wish to thank the Sloan
Foundation for sponsoring the Summer Retreat in July 2000 for the Study of
Business in Society in Warrenton, Virginia, and for including me as a fellow.
The breadth of discussion, which drew upon experts in the areas of sociology,
psychology, and economics, was useful as a means of reviewing the competing
languages in which a broadly critical and theoretical corporate law analysis
might occur. I am also grateful to participants in the London summer 2000
meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics for their
comments on my initial public presentation of the thesis in this Article. I wish
to express particular gratitude to Adam Candeub, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Brian
Kalt, Peter Kostant, Amy McCormick, Ruth Mendel, Robert Rich, Aaron
Veldheer, Robert K. Vischer, and David A. Westbrook for their stimulating
critiques and suggestions.
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 147 (1969).
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Whether narrative techniques can advance law or
enrich legal studies has been a subject of contention, 2 but
there is no doubt narrative methods have claimed ground in
some fields of law, such as criminal law and the legal
treatment of minorities. 3  Moreover, popular culture
remains an outlet for narratives that command public
fascination on many topics and events, confirming the hold
of narrative on the imagination. Yet few try to invest the
legal form of the modern corporation with narrative
interest. Among the hardy souls who try, to judge by the
long-standing and pervasive tradition of dismissing
business as a subject of interest to readers, few succeed.
Authors of judicial opinions, academicians seeking to
attract a broad readership with comprehensible accounts of
corporate logic, and popular writers hoping to create
persuasive social narratives about the contemporary
corporation fail to create narratives that attract avid
interest. Outcomes that help indicate the courts' apparent
direction in setting the law.affecting large-scale finance give
the courts' opinions sustained readership in the corporate
bar and among academic consumers as doctrinal
developments of large import, but not as fascinating tales. 4
2. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1992).
3. Signs of success include the collection LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks,& Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996), a large body of
material written for law reviews or presented in conferences to provide outsider
perspectives on law, see, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 516 (1991) and the Foundation
Press series of Law Stories.
4. But see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (on Delaware corporate law
as folk tales for corporate lawyers); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (U. of Penn., Inst. for
Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 06-16), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881 (using a combination of business press, law
firm records, institutional statements (ISS), and popular press to construct
"happy stories" about hedge fund activism that manage to create an
understanding of typical interactions between hedge funds and companies that
treat hedge funds as protagonists in an account about their tactics and
achievements).
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INTRODUCTION
In saying that business does not produce heroes, 5
Adolph Berle, the key theorist in the twentieth century
about the corporation, identified a persistent feature of the
place business occupies in the popular imagination. Books,
both fiction and nonfiction, about corporate clashes in the
world of takeovers tend to be reviewed as failures for
readers,6 filled with boring details about finance and
dominated by the figure of money, a subject of endless
fascination and desire, yet invariably seen as a nonstarter
for a good read.7
5. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT 112 (2004) (explaining that global
capitalism lacks community meanings that, like political discourse on virtue,
identify citizens as heroes); see also JAMES BUCHAN, FROZEN DESIRE: THE
MEANING OF MONEY 26 (1997) ("[M]oney cannot coexist with an epic picture of
the world....").
6. See Bryan Burrough, Fox in the Henhouse: Two Books Examine the
Scandals at Archer Daniels Midland and the Man Who Blew the Whistle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, § 7 (Book Review) at 12 (reviewing KURT EICHENWALD,
THE INFORMANT: A TRUE STORY (2000) and JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN:
THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (2000)) ("[T]here's
also a sense that the genre itself may be limited: once readers have embraced
one good book on an uproarious takeover battle, a vicious proxy fight, a tale of
Hollywood excess, a high-tech startup or an insider-trading scandal, it hasn't
been shown that they're left hungering for more.").
7. In the field of literary studies, there are claims that various novels have
greatly to do with an interpretation of capitalism, with one strong claim being
that that every nineteenth century novel was a reworking of Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations in fictional form. Michael Tratner, Professor, Bryn Mawr
College, Panel Presentation on Economics and Narrative, Uncovering Capital:
Adam Smith and the Narrative Form of the Classic English Novel (Mar. 16,
2007). Tratner also argued that the twentieth century literary representation of
debt as permissible is related to representations of sex before marriage and
involve a movement from a logic of saving and production to a logic of
circulation, with the Keynesian idea of pent-up demand as a problem being
likened to the Freudian view of repression. MICHAEL TRATNER, DEFICITS AND
DESIRES: ECONOMICS AND SEXUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE 1-7
(2001). Such a claim, needless to say, owes a debt to Michael Foucault. See id.
at 2. In the course of making a virtually all-encompassing claim about the
connection between much literature about basic human drives and economics,
Tratner notes at the very beginning of his book: "In the last hundred years,
economics has become such a technical subject that most literary studies have
found it as useless for interpreting texts as electrical engineering or molecular
biology." Id. at 1.
Away from the context of literary studies, the observations about business
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The legal materials governing the corporation parallel
and reinforce the popular view of business as empty of
narrative possibility. A variety of points from the body of
corporate law and related commentary give support to the
initial observation that corporate law is an area of the law
that filters out narrative as a source of knowledge, a
criterion of relevance, or a standard of justification. These
points are a mixture-an odd lot-of partially unrelated
characterizations of the texture of corporate law. Taken
together, they portray a body of corporate law and
associated written material that resist narrative, lack
narrators, and sometimes fail to attract readers. Indeed, it
is telling that the corporate material invested with the
greatest potential for narrative import is that which is
imagined to have told a story but to have been suppressed
by an imaginary master corporate narrator-the corporate
agent who shreds documents thought to have been selected
for destruction because of the revelatory power of their
narrative.
Four distinct observations about the corporation and
narrative establish a picture of the marginal place of
narrative in business and corporate law. First, business,
and hence the modern corporation, has not commanded
narrative interest in the past and has relatively little
potential to generate successful narratives today. Second,
corporate law does not produce legal materials that deploy
narrative techniques with any success, despite the large
stakes and portent involved in many of the corporate cases.
Third, legal scholarship on the corporation reflects the
underlying cultural facts about business and is dominated
by theory with little attempt at narrative, and no notable
success in producing narrative. Fourth, the corporation
and narrative are more earthbound. For example, reviews of books about
corporate decision-making often remark on the failure of the book as a coherent
account of anything. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Millions for Defense: Microsoft, Two
New Books Seem to Show, Lost Its Antitrust Case by Defending Too Much Too
Often, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, § 7 (Book Review), at 10 (remarking of Ken
Auletta's book on the Microsoft antitrust trial that "little of it is engaging as
narrative or valuable as commentary" and that Auletta "leaves it to the reader
to make sense of a mountain of jumbled facts and impressions"); see also
Burrough, supra note 6 ("[Tjhe last few years have not produced an abundance
of memorable nonfiction narratives set in corporate America. Among those who
have attempted the genre, there's been some debate why. It's true the world of
balance sheets and stock charts hasn't exactly been a magnet for the most
creative and inspired writers of this generation.").
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supports a form of purely instrumental discourse that can
be called alien in a strict sense: it has to do with the
actions8 of complex and highly fluid entities with legal
personality and forms of expression that displace the
discourse involving the contradictory emotions and motives
of people who exist within the corporation and, while there,
spend time telling one another stories. This discourse is an
erasing discourse that renders the human narratives within
the corporation irrelevant to the discourse of the corporate
enterprise9 and, as a consequence, uninformative about
business and largely unpromising as a source for stories
about human concerns.
The discourse generated by the corporation is
imperturbable and thus immune to the intervention of
other discourses that attract human interest. Yet it is a
product of human activity and human genius, is powerful
and functional, and gives clear direction to certain aspects
of life. 10 It is ours.11
These observations support a conclusion that reforms
aimed at the production of a large narrative about the
corporation or of specific narratives are fruitless. Corporate
law is abstract, because its subject is not readily reducible
to human stories.
8. The notion that corporate discourse is about action is expressed in many
different ways and in many contexts. For example, Presidential candidate
Rudolph Giuliani scorned the Senate's interest in passing a nonbinding
resolution about military strategy in Iraq as follows: "In the business world, if
two weeks were spent on a nonbinding resolution, it would be considered
nonproductive . . . ." Michael Finnegan, Giuliani Praises Bush's Iraq Policy,
Foresight, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at 23.
9. Compare WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 112 (saying that in the "City of
Gold" constituted by global capitalism, "the experience of transcendent value" is
"exiled to private life") with ADRIANA CAVARERO, RELATING NARRATIVES:
STORYTELLING AND SELFHOOD 36 (Paul A. Kottman trans., 2000) (equating the
lack of a story of a human being with "the absurd story of an unexposed
identity, without relations and without world").
10. I wish to thank my colleague Adam Candeub for helping me to clarify
this statement of the separation of corporate discourse from other discourse,
combined with its power and function in our lives.
11. See WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 111 ("We need not fall down and
worship money, as Mark Twain said of late-nineteenth-century Americans, but
in order to live in the City of Gold we are forced to acknowledge that price
creates our reality, and so price is a god, if not necessarily our own.").
2007] 541
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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTICLE
This article will place primary emphasis on the texture
of the body of corporate law itself as the cultural result and
the visible sign of the underlying dearth of promising
narrative materials in business. The next section, Part II,
will address the basic features of narrative, the manner in
which legal studies have deployed narrative to gain insight
about law, and the status of narrative in cultural
treatments of business. Part III will examine corporate law
as a body of writing and enumerate features that
demonstrate the absence of narrative. This section
constitutes the case in chief. It focuses on the texture of
corporate law and examines the concern expressed in
corporate reform movements about the function of
readership in cultural control over the corporation and in
detection of corporate incompetence or fraud. Part IV will
revisit cultural evidence, found in commentary on corporate
events and reviews of efforts to depict and describe business
in literature and movies, that business does not generate
comprehensible narratives. This section will also consider
how other theoretical writing relates to the thesis here
about the dearth of narrative, including general writings
about capitalism and modern organization that suggest
that alienation, or at any rate, challenges to social
imagination are an outcome of large scale rationalization of
economic life. The Conclusion suggests that narrative is not
a promising source for reform of corporate law despite the
sense that corporate law discourse lacks a richness that
narrative provides.
II. ON NARRATIVE, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, AND BUSINESS
A. General
Narrative, in basic terms, is an account of what
recognizable characters say and do, with a time sequence
that lends support to depictions of cause and effect, motives
and consequences. 12 Narratives are told by competent
12. See, e.g., NORTHROP FRYE ET AL., THE HARPER HANDBOOK TO LITERATURE
309, 443 (1997) (treating story as synonymous with narrative and defining story
as a "sequence of events"); see M.H. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS
173 (1999) (defining narrative as a story involving events, characters, and what
the characters say and do); see also Paul de Man, The Epistemology of
542 [Vol. 55
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narrators, heard by rapt listeners, and repeated in
predictable formats and in rituals of telling and listening.
Narratives have a narrator, a point of view, devices such as
prefiguring, and a sense of time. In general, the reader or
listener is guided, given a sense of place, sequence, and
significance. Events and characters are made recognizable
and given familiarity even while told as news. Narrative
occurs in many genres and is carried out in many mediums.
In a broader conceptual sense, narrative refers to sweeping
accounts involving a chronology, social forces, and cause
and effect in society.
The narrative forms that carry meaning do not arise
from a raw accumulation of facts in lives and activities but
rather at their best capture an "emplotment" that is present
in lives and activities. 13  Despite the artifice, the
manipulation and. the professional intervention associated
with storytelling, 14 it is worthwhile to contemplate that the
law's material at hand consists of a set of narratives and
discursive styles employed by the participants. 15 Thus,
bodies of legal material should vary as a result of the
underlying narratives and associated language of
participants.16
The colloquial use in the legal academy of the term
Metaphor, in ON METAPHOR 11, 21-22 (Sheldon Sacks ed., 1979) (suggesting the
"temporal deploymerit of an initial complication, of a structural knot" indicates
the "relationship between trope and narrative, between knot and plot"); id. at
28 (referring to "temporal articulations, such as narratives or histories").
13. See DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE, NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 153 (1988) (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 117 (1981), on the relationship between plots and life).
14. See id.
15. Since the participants cannot anticipate how later events will alter the
significance of earlier events, see POLKINGHORNE, supra note 13, at 50 (citing
Danto on the historian's ability to write sentences linking later events to earlier
events, such as: "In 1717, the author of Rameu's Nephew was born."), there may
seem to some limit to the emplotting possible by participants in events. But
participants do clearly create new events invested with significance in light of
earlier events and intended to reconfigure earlier events.
16. For a consideration of the rhetorical strategies of legal scholars, with a
suggestion that law's prescriptive mandate pushes scholars toward
"technocratic forms of discourse," see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law
and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155
(2006).
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"stories"'17 or "counter narratives" is a loose description of
17. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate
Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 671 (2001) (arguing that the "team
production" model of corporate governance "tells a coherent story about how the
law allows corporations to act"); see also William W. Bratton, Enron and the
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2001). Bratton provides
four alternative "stories" of what happened in Enron. He uses the term with a
fair degree of rigor, in that each one is offered as a "causation story" of Enron's
collapse (the stories are Enron as a Conventional Market Reversal, Enron as
Derivative Speculation Gone Wrong, Enron as a Den of Thieves, and Enron as a
Bank Run). Nonetheless, the complexity of the materials that Bratton deploys
as the stuff of the narrative, including as the requisite foreshadowing the Enron
effort to realize the full implications of the Coase theory of the firm and related
contractarian theories about the firm as a nexus of contracts only held together
by the calculation of a cost tradeoff between permanent arrangements and spot
purchases and adding as atmosphere a loose version of tournament theory,
challenges the conventions of narrative that revolve around matters of
accessible human interest and better vindicates the conventions of academic
theory. Bratton concludes that all four stories figure into an account of Enron's
collapse, thus confirming that narratives need not be tested by truth but
suggesting greater variety than law may prefer for conclusions. See id. at 1326.
David Westbrook provides two counter stories, one in which a conflict of interest
between Enron's management and shareholders created massive fraud, and
another in which the mutual interest of management and shareholders in
generating wealth led to a business failure. Westbrook makes a choice, lending
some support to narrative as a source of insight. See David A. Westbrook,
Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92
GEO. L.J. 61 (2003). In Bratton's account, to the extent a story with a beginning,
middle, and end, and with characters, is detectable, it emerges from a picture of
Jeffrey Skilling as a figure driven by a deep understanding of the Coasean
theory of the firm, a commitment to a tournament approach to personnel, a
possible rational choice to gamble in a manner typical of the "end period
problem," and as a scapegoat victimized by an ex post reassessment of the
benefits of interested director transactions. Perhaps Enron is a cultural moment
permitting narrative to be made of the adventures of an MBA trying to
actualize the highlights of his courses on economic and organizational theory
and bringing economic disaster to untold thousands. But the narrative
concludes in the ambiguities of complex explanation and the need of multi-
variant analysis. See Bratton, supra, at 1331-32. By contrast, a different
academic use of the terms "narrative" and "story" appears more successful.
Goodwin Liu writes about the cultural narrative of the Bakke case, in which
there is a story of a white applicant who is displaced by a minority applicant
favored by affirmative action. In the story, belied by the causation fallacy
explained by Liu through statistical analysis, a more qualified applicant is
displaced by a less qualified applicant. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:
Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1045-46 (2001). The cultural success of the narrative is illustrated by Liu's
recollection of the political advertisement that depicted two white hands
crumpling a job application and a voice saying, "'You needed that job ... And
you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of a
racial quota. Is that really fair?"' Id. at 1047 (quoting Peter Applebome, Subtly
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accounts that give either a positive or negative assessment
of certain corporate practices or forms. In the world of
corporate scholarship, the term "story" lends a frisson of
interest or fashion to standard debates about the
significance to assign the basics of corporate law and
practice. It has some rhetorical power to suggest an account
containing comprehensible, accessible elements with
listener appeal. At conferences, at the mention of a story,
heads turn and members of the audience shift in their
seats. But the use of the term is by no means rigorous nor
associated with rich narrative accounts of corporate life and
it usually ends with a sense that a pleasant but ultimately
fruitless diversion has passed. Even in scholarly legal
writing, references to narrative and storytelling tend not to
be rigorously distinguished.1 8
A useful example of a narrative technique that has
social power is the description by Joan Didion in her book,
Political Fictions, of a successful and powerful social
narrative. Didion argues that there is an inside group of
political elites, located in Washington, D.C., who impose a
narrative on American political life. 19 The narrative is
sustained by an attentive audience and is designed to
maintain an illusion that national political life is
characterized by broad consensus, in which the citizen's
choice, based on an evaluation of small differences and an
assessment of the candidate's character, is a vital
and Not, Race Bubbles Up as Issue in North Carolina Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1990, at Al.). While populist appeals relating to business have some
currency, they do not have the impact as cultural narrative that the "story" of
affirmative action has had.
18. Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 807 (collapsing the categories of
narrative and storytelling). Indeed, a skeptic about the practice of legal
scholarship might well question whether the term "narrative" means anything
in the writing of legal academics. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 184-85 (1990) (describing the life cycle of the word
"freedom" as a rhetorical lever and its loss of meaning in an inflationary spiral
of over and instrumental use). In a personal conversation with Stephen
Schulman, he suggested that that the term "narrative" adds little to discourse
about corporations because, like the term "adumbrate," it doesn't mean
anything. Conversation with the late Stephen H. Schulman, Professor
Emeritus, Wayne State University Law School, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (June 16,
1996).
19. See JOAN DIDION, POLITICAL FICTIONS 22 (2001) (referring to "the handful
of insiders who invent, year in and year out, the narrative of public life").
20071 545
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determinant of the national course. 20 The candidate's
biography is deployed to invent a character useful to the
political narrative.21 Staged events, in which all who
participate in the retailing of the narrative about the
candidate are aware of the staging, become part of the
drama by which the character of the candidate is linked to a
story of citizen choice. 22 Although the narrative is contrived
(as narrative is), the thesis implicitly is that it is effective
with an audience. It influences the cultural understanding
of our politicians and it makes memorable our leaders,
whose supposed traits are linked to our national history.
Didion's claim is that the candidates are influenced to stage
narratives that are then reported by the cultural keepers of
the forms of predominant political narrative. Thus, the
characteristic language and performances associated with
national politics lend themselves to narrative and help
develop expert narrators. Both the enterprise and the
culturally prominent writing about it are infused with
narrative techniques.
An area of law in which scholars create successful
narrative accounts is instructive in its resemblance to
political narrative. Bankruptcy law has been analyzed, with
a degree of power, as drawing upon narratives and counter-
narratives about risk management. The body of bankruptcy
law and commentary provides considerable detail about the
human effects of financial reversal, the differing candidates
in American history for debt relief and the political import
of the law's variable response, and the ebb and flow of
policy under differing historical conditions, driven by the
effect of financial risk on the middle class. 23 While
bankruptcy as a legal subject is regarded as dry and
technical, the story of bankruptcy is nonetheless a human
story about the needs and emotions of people, the peril of
financial dislocation and moral condemnation, and the ebb
20. See id. at 37-44.
21. See id. at 41.
22. See id. at 43-44.
23. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 305-06 (2003) (reviewing EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING
FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
(2001), BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002), and DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OR BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001)).
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and flow of narratives and counter-narratives used to
influence bankruptcy policy. 24
B. In Legal Scholarship
Many legal writers associate narrative storytelling with
particularity that resists attachment to legal conclusions. 25
Robert Cover presents a different picture in Folktales of
Justice whereby a core story elucidates and yields a judicial
conclusion. 26 But other writers contrast the empirical
element in legal reasoning with legal storytelling, because
stories are seen as nonempirical in that they focus on a
narrator's experience of events. 27  The storytelling
movement is associated with feminism and critical race
theory and with the idea of "voice"-giving a hearing to the
unheard perspectives of non-dominant groups, which law is
said to silence. 28 The term "narrative" has come to be
associated in legal scholarship with "outsider" stories the
telling of which disrupts a dominant discourse, whatever its
form. Dominant discourse, without consideration of its
narrative content, is treated as a presence which
marginalizes outsider accounts of the realities that law
mediates. In scholarly journals, there has been some degree
of effort to "foreground" narratives that arise from
individual stories told by whomever is selected to have her
or his voice amplified.
Thus, most attention in legal writing about narrative
has been focused on allowing individuals to soften the law's
rules with claims of perceptions and histories that might
24. See id.
25. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971,
1030 (1991); Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 807-08.
26. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14
CAP. U. L. REV. 179-82 (1984).
27. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and
Constitutional Law: The Medium and the Message, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 7 (contrasting the feminist
wellspring of the legal storytelling movement with "grand theory" in law).
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA
AND RACE (1995) has been well received for using a technique of storytelling, in
which the protagonist author reports conversations with a fictional student. The
Chronicles succeed in raising issues about race through trenchant observations,
which, though not empirical in nature, are nonetheless sharply observed and
useful as a source to generate and evaluate theoretical frameworks on race.
28. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 827 n.113.
20071 547
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undermine the authority of the law's claim to neutrality
and objectivity. There is less examination of the function of
narrative throughout the body of law as an expression of
dominant or recurring social interpretations that yield,
support and legitimate legal outcomes 29 than there is of
narrative's role in the exposition of recurring social
interpretations imbedded in law. Thus, narrative has been
described as "a form of countermajoritarian argument, a
genre for oppositionists intent on showing up the exclusions
that occur in legal business-as-usual .... -30
But, narrative as a general term concerns a form of
expression which carries human meaning; as such,
elements of narrative necessarily appear in the legal
expressions of majority will and elements of narrative are
necessarily present in a large variety of contexts: the
expression of majority will, the explanation of social and
economic practices, the claims of the privileged as well as
the unprivileged. 31 The creation of a series of books for law
school basic classes that use stories prepared for various
legal subjects emphasizes the sense that narrative is a
source of insight and knowledge about the content and
29. But see Paul Gewirtz, Introduction to LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 4-5.
30. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAw's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 16.
31. The basis for my interest in narrative differs from the "storytelling
movement," which, according to Farber and Sherry, has "argued that stories
can change the mindsets that underlie current social institutions," and has
likewise "asserted that existing mindsets like racism and sexism have been
created by stories told by dominant groups . . . ." Farber & Sherry, supra note
27, at 37, 44. According to Farber and Sherry, the storytelling movement argues
that only storytelling can genuinely persuade; logical argument cannot. Claims
that valorize storytelling in the abstract, particularly associated with issues of
substance, draw upon sentimentality and rhetoric. See id. at 44. While my
thesis could support a view that conscious attention to narrative may be a
beneficial supplement to the law and practice of the corporation, compare
Farber & Sherry, id. at 43, I do not suggest, and instead dispute, that a clearer
view of the role of narrative in corporate law calls for a new "mindset" about
corporations. To say that the public corporation draws its power from a
dominant group narrative would have some rhetorical appeal, but to specify
that narrative-its content, its voices, its evolution, its devices-would be a
formidable task indeed. It seems just as plausible that, as hypothesized, the
public corporation and its law have arisen in response to business needs and
have derived some of their power, but also suffered in popular regard, from the
relative void in stories of corporate governance.
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derivation of law. 32 A reason for close attention to narrative
as a form in which society creates and conveys meaning has
much to do with an assessment, albeit one that attracts
ample critique,33 of narrative as a form of knowledge and
insight.34
In another professional context, Robert Coles lauds the
facility in clinical psychiatry of a doctor's "being a good
listener" to the stories of patients rather than becoming
overly theoretical in the course of devising a treatment.
Coles's point includes the idea that the jargon of the
psychiatric profession obscures the underlying narratives
that patients carry with them. While Coles suggests that
patients would benefit from telling these narratives to "an
active listener," who would have an effect on the shaping of
the story, 35 there is no suggestion that narratives are
unmediated manifestations of the real. It is presumably
clear that none of the proponents of narrative believe that
narrative is a form of transmitting reality free of categories
that organize, frame and "construct" meanings.
Nonetheless, the suggestion is made that attention to
narrative by a professional carries with it a humanity that
emphasizes, as in the doctor-patient relationship,
sensitivity to the place stories hold in the making and
examination of a person's life or of certain critical
32. Foundation Press has launched a series of "law stories" books for use in
law school classes, beginning with Tax Stories. The Foundation website
explains as follows: "In the new Law Stories titles from Foundation Press, the
General Editors and their guest contributors bring famous cases to life by
telling the true, never-heard-before stories behind landmark cases. This
fascinating series of texts covers significant cases in major areas of law,
including tax, torts, constitutional law, civil procedure and property."
Westacademic.com Product Lines, http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/
/ProductLines.aspx?tab=l (last visited May 7, 2007).
33. Robert Weisberg describes, with overtones of skepticism, the claims of
some proponents of narrative method in law that judges with an ability to
discover "true" narratives underlying legal abstractions are in possession of a
superior "moral craft." Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives:
Premises and Pretenses, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW,
supra note 3, at 66; see also Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 24, 32 (describing
"exploration" by several scholars of Hannah Arendt's methodological
commitment to narrative in preference to the prevailing methods of social
science).
34. See ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES 23, 25 (1989).
35. See id. at 17-19.
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affiliations. There is some implication that attention to
client stories reduces the displacement of authentic
narratives by professionals employing legal abstractions,
thus in some possible, but perhaps ephemeral, way
empowering clients rather than attorneys. A critic, Robert
Weisberg, has suggested that certain genres of storytelling
in scholarship, such as poverty law stories, carry with them
an air of discovery about the simple facts of law life-
lawyers collect facts and put them into some sort of
persuasive order that advances the interests of their
clients.36 Weisberg also suggests that much of the talk
surrounding narrative in law really takes the form of a
speech act-lawyers or scholars congratulating themselves
for their demonstration of the moral superiority required to
recognize that clients have stories. 37
C. About Business
Business provides an occasional setting for narratives,
but, at bottom, the narratives are not about business and do
not create a large story or narratives that demand to be
repeated by storytellers. The predominant form in which
business is conducted and studied is a formalized entity
with which people have no deep affinity. Their emotions are
banished from the cognizable discourse of the entity.38
While there are some efforts to tell a good story in a
business setting, such stories are not about the corporation
or about business. The parts, meaning the human needs
and emotions, do not equal the whole. Moreover, as will be
discussed, readers abandon official corporate text, reading
it only fitfully and in dribs and drabs. The reading of
corporate text is not done as "real reading," in which the
reader attempts to take in and digest a whole.
Legal scholarship's occasional efforts to address the
human emotions in the business setting are done by way of
the law and behavior movement without concerning
36. See Weisberg, supra note 33, at 63-64 (maintaining consistent posture of
intellectual skepticism about the "speech acts" associated with the storytelling
movement and implying that many insights of the storytelling movement are
trivial).
37. See id.
38. See WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 112 (saying the City "seems to have no
place for whatever is appropriate to being human but outside the marketplace,"
and commenting that the City "embodies no meaning that unifies the people").
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themselves with accounts of human particulars.39 They
suggest that quantifiable information about behavior can
help to shape doctrines toward greater fit with the human
materials but they do not support the need for or the
production of specific narratives: they are technocratic
efforts 40 at refinement of the organizational logic. The
location of the work is in the social sciences, not the
humanities.41
Law review articles have touched on the discursive
character of popular depictions of business and the
rhetorical character of corporate law from several angles.
Such articles include suggestions that the popular depiction
of business is primarily negative, 42 especially as revealed in
movies; investigations of how certain types of rhetoric, as
about stakeholders, 43 might figure in the construction of
doctrine with real effect; treatment of the rhetorical
strategy of the Delaware courts;44 and recent commentary
on the absence of religious faith from corporate discourse as
a shortfall of the corporate form and culture.45 That popular
culture transmits a negative view of business 46 appears to
suggest that there is a popular narrative about the
39. For an example, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1735 (2000).
40. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 16.
41. See id. at 155-56.
42. See Michael Asimow, Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in the Movies, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1339, 1373 (2001) (arguing that law firms are treated negatively
in business as a reflection of a universally negative treatment of business in
movies); see also Anthony Chase, Civil Action Cinema, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV.
945, 952-57 (1999); Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & Bus.
REV. 165 (2006) [hereinafter Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street]; Phillip Lopate,
The Corporation as Fantasy Villain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at B24; Larry
Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business (Ill. Law and
Econ. Working Papers Series, Paper No. LE05-010, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=563181 [hereinafter Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine].
43. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005).
44. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005).
45. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Law, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
46. See Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine, supra note 42 (claiming view is
heavily negative).
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corporation: one that deploys accessible narratives to make
a case against business for a mass audience. While there
may be a grain of truth in the notion that business is
sometimes a setting for tropes of corruption and evil in the
modern world, the better view is that movies produce plots
about sinister power that is exercised in secret, 47 and
business is sometimes the setting for that type of narrative.
Further, the argument, sometimes made, that movie
producers are hostile to capital, given their need to beg for
it for their art, and hence portray a negative view of
capitalism, 48 is countered by the view that movies may well
ignore recent corporate scandals because movie studios are
part of corporate conglomerates. 49
A more likely explanation is that business is not fertile
ground for generating profit from a mass market for
entertainment. 50 Indeed, some of the same writing that
claims movies portray business in a negative light makes
the point that the facts about business are too complex to be
portrayed.51 While narrative is not tested by truth, and it
might be possible to identify narratives about business that
are misleading, narrative nonetheless arises from an
impulse to report or portray a human experience that bears
telling to an interested listener. Hence, narrative places the
listener in the circumstance of the narrator, with access to a
comprehensible account of the events reported and their
significance for the listener. Even the critics of business
movies who fear their influence on public opinion agree that
47. See Dave Kehr, Seeing Business Through Hollywood's Lens, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2002, § 4, at 5 (equating postwar film noir thrillers with "economic as
well as metaphysical implications" in which "apparently respectable
businessmen who were actually fronts for crime and corruption" served as
heavies).
48. See Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, supra note 42, at 198.
49. See Kehr, supra note 47, at 5.
50. Working Girl and Nine to Five are examples of successful mass market
movies in a business setting. WORKING GIRL (20th Century Fox 1988); NINE TO
FIVE (20th Century Fox 1980). They explore issues of gender and old-fashioned
sexism without revealing much about business. Working Girl is probably best
classified as a romantic comedy, and Nine to Five as a farce. Their highest claim
to being a serious narrative about business might be as a latter day stab at
portrayal of the gender ideology in corporations that is depicted in the work of
ANGEL KWOLEK-FOLLAND, ENGENDERING BUSINESS: MEN AND WOMEN IN THE
CORPORATE OFFICE, 1870-1930 (1994).
51. See Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, supra note 42, at 197.
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they do not achieve this mission. There is a dearth of
accessible, compelling narratives that give
comprehensibility and interpretation for a mass audience to
the affairs of the corporation as witnessed and relayed by a
competent narrator. In short, business is dull.
Thus, although law in general is said to minimize
narrative forms of knowledge, 52 and, further, some say that
narrative has lost ground in the contemporary culture, the
corporation is particularly unlikely to produce narratives
that account for and explain the corporation, business
practice, or the legal outcomes in corporate law. A movie
like Wall Street,53 analyzed as intentionally conveying a
negative view of business, 54 is more correctly seen as an
effort to evoke an excitement and energy that is associated
with the production of wealth. A play on a 1950s television
play called Patterns,55 about corporate intrigue, similarly
did not generate either a pat conclusion or a
comprehensible narrative about business, corporate finance,
or securities fraud.56 Business movies explore themes about
money, greed, sex, the pace and excitement of velocity in
trading, fathers and sons, and modern gadgetry, 57 but they
virtually never present a coherent narrative of corporate
financial logic or point to a conclusion about business,
except at the highest level of generality about the
emptiness of modern organizational culture.
In the relatively simple terms by which I have defined
narrative and excluded informal uses of the term "story," it
seems fair to say that corporate law, and the corporation
itself, and the practices and culture of the corporation,
generate relatively little of narrative interest or
explanatory power for any potential audience brought
together by the narrative. Stated more strongly, the
52. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 16.
53. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
54. See Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, supra note 42, at 198.
55. PA'TrERNS (United Artists 1956).
56. See Raymond Rosenthal, TV Drama, COMMENTARY, Jan. 5, 1958, at 455-
56 (criticizing the absence of a coherent moral lesson or resolution in Serling's
television play as well as his discussion of it in his book of plays and
additionally describing Madison Avenue offices as a usefully "suave" setting for
the depiction of illicit feelings).
57. See, e.g., WALL STREET, supra note 53.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
corporation evacuates meaning and resists
comprehensibility in the terms in which matters of general
human interest are communicated. Corporate law provides
comprehensibility of a self-referential nature for a relative
few who prize its abstractions and embrace its codification
as a constructed narrative of the possibility of narrative. 58
Certain statutes, for example, purport to establish a story
about how some restraint on the process of indemnification
is established through procedures that tend to create
opportunities for moral narratives within the corporation. 59
Corporate law scholars have suggested that the Securities
and Exchange Commission devised an approach to insider
trading prosecution that allows the agency to tell a story-
one that involves an idea of criminality-that gives the
agency advantages in competing for resources. 60
What of the efforts to use narrative to critique the
corporation? The critiques of the corporation by progressive
scholars and activists fail as narrative, tending to register
as a complaint in search of a cause. The anti-globalization
eruptions might be seen as attempted narrative, but they
lack the drama or coherent message their proponents hope
to generate. 61 The lack of narrative interest in the
corporation infects those who aspire to make a critical
narrative about the corporation and extends the aridness of
58. See Mae Kuykendall, Assessment and Evaluation: Retheorizing the
Evolving Rules of Director Liability, 8 J.L. & POL'Y. 1, 58 (1999).
59. See id.
60. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 585 (2002)
(referring to the public choice "story" of insider trading and arguing that it
explains the SEC's interest in a "budget-enhancing enforcement program");
Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's
Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 452 (2001)
(describing the SEC's use of rhetoric and symbols). The effort to create a story
about the SEC and not about the content of the law itself is perhaps
necessitated by the logical structure of the insider trading law, illustrated by
the thorough and systematic analysis of insider trading legal logic: whether
insider trading has a victim, whether it can be considered fraud by analogy to
other types of fraud, whether variants on classical insider trading withstand
logical scrutiny as an actionable transgression, and what the remedies can be
under federal securities law. See William K. S. Wang, Reuschlein Lecture: Stock
Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies-Including an
Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car With a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L.
REV. 27 (2000).
61. See WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 3 (referring to "arguments that the
protesters might have made had they been sufficiently coherent").
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corporate logic and practice to attacks on it.62 As an
example, the matter of executive compensation eludes
striking narratives, despite the obvious possibilities of
social resentment about extravagant pay. 6 3 The recent
Disney case, while attracting great interest, sustains very
little interest as a story with twists and turns: Eisner gave
Ovitz a lot of money, and the board went along, at the front
end and the back end.6 4 The business judgment rule
applies.
The absence of narrative from corporate law is
substantially explained by the nature of the undertaking of
producing wealth and by the social formation of business.
The absence of narrative is not a nefarious scheme to
undermine critique, although it tends to have that effect.
Rather, the underlying project of generating wealth does
not produce rich human stories. Nostalgia about a
supposedly innocent time before the corporate form gained
social and legal power attempts to locate a social loss (of a
moral narrative) in the destruction of a pastoral innocence
when states began to charter corporations freely and thus
to tell a social story,65 but it is a nostalgia with few who
62. See id. at 11 (describing globalization as "widely understood to be
unstoppable, about as responsive to political thought as the weather").
63. A recent effort to explain executive compensation by offering an
interpretation of class, and not simply individual greed, is the effort of Professor
Westbrook to account for executive compensation as a form of behavior in which
paying more for an item bespeaks status. See David A. Westbrook, Notes
Toward a Theory of the Executive Class (July 31, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). The account is cultural interpretation and not
narrative, however.
64. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
65. In 1981, Professor Werner described what he called the "erosion
doctrine" as a part of the "folklore of big corporations." Walter Werner,
Corporation Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1613 (1981).
He summarized the folklore as follows:
This view would have it that the corporation once behaved as it was
supposed to. The shareholders who owned the corporation controlled it.
They elected a board of directors to whom they delegated management
powers, but they retained residual control, uniting control and
ownership. In the nation's early years the states created corporations
sparingly and regulated them strictly. The first corporations, run by
their proprietors and constrained by law, exercised state-granted
privileges to further the public interest. The states then curtailed
regulation, shareholders abdicated control, and this Eden ended. The
corporation expanded into a huge concentrate of resources. Its
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partake. Efforts to make of the business narrative void a
narrative about an intentional void are not successful
strategies to create narrative in the sense used here but are
at best generalized complaints about capitalism and even
about modern life in a complex, interdependent society.
They are not successful narrative interventions within the
framework of business culture, business law, and business
practice. Within the frame of modern life, the social
formation that is business is unpromising as a source of
narrative, and narrative is unpromising as a means of
critiquing or reforming the corporation.
III. CORPORATE LAW: No IMAGINATION
Telltale signs of a troubled relation to narrative in
corporate law, which provides the legal engine of modern
business logic and practice and the written record of the
more salient and contested corporate events of the day, are
the lack of success in embodying shareholders as
flesh-and-blood participants in corporate battles; judicial
doctrines that purposely occlude the details of corporate
board deliberations by presuming most board conduct
normal and unconflicted (the business judgment rule); the
lack of a sense of place in the cases (and in movies only
occasional depictions of cathedral-like boardrooms that
dwarf the participants); the adequacy of the abstraction of
the corporate construct to carry the ultimate dream
forward, that of money; the mastery of corporate insiders
over non-expressive forms of speech; the failure of
businessmen to function comprehensibly as characters
related to a plot about corporate law; statutes designed to
check the impulse of judges to impose moral frameworks on
business dealings in corporations; the disappearance from
the cases of a trope of gender from which the cultural
confidence for early corporate law decisions was derived
and which, using the figure of manliness, provided a wedge
for moralizing about standards of corporate conduct; the
resistance of corporate law to moralistic and narrative
forms of critique; the uncertain staying power of villains
operation vitally affected society, but it was run by managers who were
accountable only to themselves and could blink at obligations to
shareholders and society. Thus, it is believed, the need was born to
reexamine the social role and internal structure of big corporations.
Id. at 1612.
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such as Ken Lay as cultural bogeymen; and the elusiveness
of corporate text to its putative readers, such as
shareholders drafted to be readers of complex regulatory
filings, business journalists, corporate readers in the
boardroom, and judges themselves.
Moving from the text to the intended readers, we see a
revealing characteristic of our relationship to business and
to business law, two matters that are distinct yet part of an
overall group of phenomena clustered within capitalism,
business, corporate law opinions, legislation about the
corporation, and scholarly literature on the corporation. We
are faced with our collective absenteeism as readers of
critical corporate text and business disclosures. The
recurring unmasking of most of us as derelict readers of
corporate text reveals the "convention of the unread" and
releases a predictable alarm of the school master as a
recurring feature of corporate discourse. Further, it brings
to the surface anxieties about our relationship to corporate
text and business culture and finds a focal point for concern
about the elusiveness of corporate social logic.
Through Enron we learned that a company's board, its
analysts, its lawyers and accountants, and its shareholders
failed as readers, whether the reading involved corporate
reports, corporate disclosures, or corporate documents. The
response has been efforts to install a hypothetical reader by
increasing legally mandated reporting requirements and
imagining a readership that could have been and that will
be. The outraged reaction to shredding of unread documents
functions as a marker for a simultaneous recognition and
rejection of our derelictions. Denouncing shredding gives
hopes of introducing a seemingly absent moral dimension
associated with cultural narrative because the destruction
is a marker of concealment, suggesting there is something
to be concealed. Documents destroyed in bulk, and surely
doomed to have been unread if allowed their repose, are
given iconic narrative import and the status of revelatory
but missing text.
Ironically, then, we are most fascinated by corporate
text that cannot present itself for us to read. Documents
rendered unreadable are given significance because the
notion of concealment reinserts the corporation into the
knowable world of everyday moral insight. Not surprisingly,
this occurs at the moment that the corporation enters the
domain of the criminal. Yet, given the failures of corporate
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text, reforms that posit a hypothetical reader of more
documents than are now disclosed, but that remain unread,
are certain to fail.
In her story about Enron, Bethany McLean repeats
often that people think Enron is about numbers, but it's
really about people. 66 Georg Simmel provides the reason
why, in truth, Enron was about numbers, i.e., a flawed
business model: "The personality as a mere holder of a
function or position is just as irrelevant as that of a guest in
a hotel room."67 When large sums of money are lost after
unusual corporate events, there is a wish to see human
agency attached to personality in a narrative that
supplants mechanical position or function. The raw
materials for a monitored narrative of corporate decision-
making do not present themselves from the hypothetical
being-a merger of abstract, unreportable human
complexity,68 and summary money figures-that is the
corporation. Enron was in the end about abstraction, not
about people.
A. The Convention of the Unread in Corporate Speech and
the Predominance of the Language of Accounting
The mastery of corporate legal speech and the unvoiced
content of corporate ritual is conveyed by the example of
senior lawyers to junior lawyers, who "show" by writing and
rewriting.69 For those who do not become novitiates
66. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM:
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
67. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 296 (Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 1990).
68. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 232-33; Bayless Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality,
39 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1983) (explaining the lack of specific decision points by
boards in a process of fluid interaction); see also Philippe Carrard, When Wall
Street Sighs: Narratives of the Market and Personification (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (discussing, in connection with AP writers
about the market, the difficulty of unpacking a rhetorically unconvincing
personification of the market into all the transactions that take place in a day).
69. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 280 ("Reading long and boring legal
documents is what boards pay their lawyers and subordinates to do."). While
documents are written with care to govern legal rights, it is also true that a
substantial function met by the production and reproduction of corporate
documents is the demonstration to junior lawyers of the art of writing such
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learning to ape the mannerisms of internal corporate
speech, the speech of the corporation eludes attention and
masks narratives of modern life that might emerge from
corporate intrigue.
1. The Corporate Law Firm. In a story of a corporate
firm, Louis Auchincloss gives an ironic account of a senior
partner whose sanity was placed under stress when a voice
tied to the ghost of a former partner broke through to assert
a vulgar and unmasking narrative voice in a corporate
biography of the founding partner.70 On regaining his
composure and restoring his corporate authorial persona,
the senior partner reestablished the correct tone of a firm
history. Auchincloss provides his inner thoughts: "Was
there not something restful, dignified, even rather noble
about the well-prepared, the well-documented, the well-
printed, the well-bound, and the unread?"71 The speech of
corporate legal governance is a speech for a legal person
eluding the claims of narrative, disjoined from the human
details of motive, plot, and setting, or the perennial interest
created by such matters as gender, greed, and betrayal. It is
a speech that resists the need for readers-but "what [does]
it matter so long as there [is] peace?" 72 Yet it occupies space
documents. Their readership serves as one significant function the internal
creation and maintenance of a corporate clerisy, catechized in the forms of
ritual contained in "deal" documents bound in books, sometimes embossed in
gold with the name of the lawyers who helped create and entomb them. I am
grateful to Lyman Johnson for the term "corporate clerisy."
70. Louis Auchincloss, The Senior Partner's Ghosts, in TRIAL AND ERROR 357
(Fred R. Shapiro & Jane Garry eds., 1998).
71. Id. at 367. A literary critic gives a degree of validation to the impulse to
create corporate bodies of text that are bereft of readers by his thesis that
reading is a solitary act with few consequences for public life--"the pleasures of
reading ... are selfish rather than social." HAROLD BLOOM, HOW TO READ AND
WHY 22 (2000). The corporate practice of public text that provides a social
surface but repels readers in search of "the idiosyncratic," see id. at 23, may
then sacrifice little in the way of insights usable for corporate law or morality.
The edifice of nominal text creates a social effect that a text for actual
readership does not. But what is the act done by those who study the words of
corporate law and absorb its meaning? For a suggestion, see Douglas Litowitz,
The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 506 (2005) (describing the inability
of Arthur Levitt, the former chair of the SEC, to comprehend the disclosure
documents of his mutual fund investments).
72. Auchincloss, supra note 70, at 372. A writer about Catholic moral
theology has made an interesting claim about the intentional rhetorical
strategy of Catholic moral teaching about sex: "What we complain of as the
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and creates legal mass. Indeed, commercial contracts and
similar documents are not read by decision-makers; many
may not be read by any one person, and perhaps not read at
all. The social role of such writing is unclear, although it
has a function as a form of writing that is read to be
mastered and emulated by lawyers, whose job in reading it
is to learn to produce it for reading by other lawyers
learning to produce it. It is written to be pulled from the file
room in the future and read and re-used, and for the
immediate corporate function it serves.
The form of the discourse serves a function of erasing
the self of the corporate lawyer. In contrast to the litigator,
the corporate lawyer sets out to produce text that erases his
identity, rendering him a perfect servant of the formalized
corporate entity. The corporate lawyer has no narrative
purpose. He has rhetorical strategies encapsulated in the
Auchincloss coda: "the well-prepared, the well-documented,
the well-printed, the well-bound, and the unread."73 And
corporate lawyers have attained a mastery of corporate
discourse that can only be admired. They are corporate
paladins who bring a healing quality to corporate speech by
a gentle displacement of the observably human with
imperturbable and expert corporate text.
2. Lay views of corporate text. The power of what I refer
to as a corporate "convention of the unread" is repeatedly
manifested in common reactions to corporate law and
scholarship and the practice of readers presented with
corporate materials. The usual theme is the lack of a sense
of recognizable agency cast in comprehensible human
terms. In commenting on a law review article about
corporate governance, a nonlawyer writer/editor, whose
mother was a lawyer and occasional teacher of law classes,
'tedium' of official moral theology is a defensive rhetoric that protects the claims
of authoritative speakers on obedient hearers. Tedium is, in short, part of the
now prevailing rhetorical program of modern Catholic morals." MARK D.
JORDAN, THE SILENCE OF SODOM: HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN CATHOLICISM 54
(2000). Some parts of semi-official corporate rhetorical conventions seem to bear
some similarity to the asserted uses of tedium in conveying an un-arguable
claim of authority. But tedium in corporate speech may arise from the nature of
the material as much as from a strategy of rhetoric. Nonetheless, as a social
structure, the corporate edifice contains conventions of speech that include as a
purpose suppressing an opening for revision, complexity or corporate ambiguity.
73. Auchincloss, supra note 70, at 367.
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and who was involved herself with an internet magazine
about entrepreneurship, commented, "All the things that
make reading-indeed law-interesting to me were
missing. Human motivation, cultural context, human
agency."74 Similarly, a well-known writer of critical social
interpretation commented to me that she took corporate
law for an entire year in law school and still has no idea of
how to read the tables in the Wall Street Journal. The
implicit theme-that corporate law is impenetrable and not
made to connect to the one thing, stock tables, that it would
appear to connect to-is a common refrain among law
students who have taken corporate law but developed no
interest in the subject. 75 More simply, the numbers, which
are understood as the real action, do not emerge from the
body of corporate law as an understandable subject of the
cases. The doctrine, and the related material about the
holders of the functions that produce money, do not make
the real subject-numbers-comprehensible to those for whom
they are not a natural interest.
Barbarians at the Gate76 tells a story of corporate
finance and provides narrative interest by setting a stage
for the numerous characters with background about their
family history, whether their fathers played a role in
passing on a business interest to them, and the history of
the firms that become involved in the battle for RJR
Nabisco. Despite the discipline and story-telling skill of the
authors, the threads of the story do not weave a simplifying
message about the corporate rules for fundamental change
nor do they present a readily narratable tale to be repeated
and relished. In addition, reviewers were not sold on the
human interest imparted by the characters, or the setting,
or the action. According to Michael Thomas:
the public wants personalities, vivid in conflict, glamorous, and
preferably detestable (the publishers of Barbarians have
emphasized the book's likely appeal to fans of Tom Wolfe and
Dominick Dunne). But when all is said and done, deals like this
74. Interview with Jacqueline Lapidus, Boston-based Editor and Writer, in
Provincetown, Mass. (July 29, 2000).
75. Personal Conversation with anonymous source, in Provincetown, Mass.
(July 27, 1996).
76. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL
OF RJR NABISCO (1990).
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stand or fall on their true costs, and I've yet to see balance sheet
bought for a miniseries. 77
In addition, "reading [the] two books [is] an exhausting
and not altogether agreeable diversion [and] .... is the story
of a number of men of no particular... distinction. .... ,,78
The predominant student reaction to the subject of
corporate law in law school provides further evidence.
Despite all efforts by professors of corporate law, students
conclude time after time that "corporate law is dry." The
claim by corporate professors that the field is intricate,
fascinating, and intellectually challenging persuades a tiny
few-a corps of future corporate law professors, and, at the
best schools, those instinctively drawn to the malleability of
the corporate form and the excitement of facilitating
conceptual arrangements that relocate money and power.
But the attraction for the few to corporate law is their own
conceptual power, not the nourishment provided by vivid
stories about the players in corporate law. The average
student, whose imagination is not caught by the link
between the corporate abstraction and self-actualization,
maintains a resistance to the appeal of corporate law. 79
Scholarship on narrative takes into account audience
77. Michael M. Thomas, Greed, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 29, 1990, at 3
(reviewing BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990) and HOPE LAMPERT, TRUE GREED: WHAT REALLY
HAPPENED IN THE BATTLE FOR RJR NABISCO (1990)).
78. Id.
79. In explaining why he "does not teach Van Gorkom," Professor Lawrence
Hamermesch notes that Van Gorkom contains complex facts about such matters
as "reported earnings and cash flow" and that "Van Gorkom cannot be fully
grasped without understanding factual matters that must surely be alien to
most law students." Lawrence Hamermesch, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom,
34 GA. L. REV. 477, 480-82 (2000). Professor Lyman Johnson urges law
professors to teach, and hence engage and challenge, corporate law students by
infusing technical corporate terms like care and loyalty with their more
common moral meanings. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of
Corporate Law Professors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2002) (suggesting that
law professors generally "introduce students to corporate law discourse through
words that are technical, professional, and lacking any connection to the larger
social milieu"). It is Professor Johnson's concern that a law professor's use of
terms that have moral meaning in a technical way will truncate the moral
imagination of eventual corporate lawyers, but a related effect is the
disengagement of law students with a body of material that lacks connection to
"the larger social milieu." Id.
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reaction, and the engagement that types of narrative
generate.8 0 Narrative is treated as having a magic,
whatever the source and true power of the magic8 ' we all
know. So law professors make occasional, and somewhat
feeble efforts, to lay claim to narrative interest based on a
few facts lying about in cases but mostly unexplored.8 2
3. Shying from Using Language to Convey Meaning.
One common claim is that, "[a]ccounting is the language of
business." 83 The statement is perhaps belied by the
substantial body of observations that business does not
speak and is not heard. Pungent observations about the
divide between business language and the usual function of
language to provide information are not hard to find. In
explaining the extraordinary reaction to former Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill's blunt speech, Michael Lewis has
written: "It violates the central tenet of Washington
financial life: never use the English language to convey
meaning."8 4 While the convention of Washington speech
about finance is arguably a distinct construct, it is
nonetheless not surprising to associate the speech of
business-in-government with the opaque. Other political
80. See JAMES PHELAN, NARRATIVE AS RHETORIC: TECHNIQUE, AUDIENCES,
ETHICS, IDEOLOGY 28 (1996) (referring to the intellectual and emotional
engagement asked by a writer of an audience).
81. See id. at 8-15.
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 93 (4th ed. 2000) (describing Martin v.
Peyton as follows: "Martin v. Peyton ... is important for its discussions of legal
doctrine and for what it reveals about business relationships. Beyond that, its
facts can evoke thoughts about human relationships and feelings-about
friendships, trust and distrust, greed, honesty and dishonesty, self-delusion,
anger, fear, and so on-that form the background from which the cases
emerges. Imagine the tale behind this case being turned into a novel or short
story by Henry James, John Cheever, or John Updike. Appreciation of the
insights of such authors may be as essential to good lawyering as is mastery of
legal doctrine").
83. CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 3 (9th ed. 2000).
84. Michael Lewis, O'Neill's List, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2002, at 20, 23;
see also Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Swears Off Improvising, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2006, at C1 (asserting that, as a result of market reaction to a remark
by Federal Reserve chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Bernanke "is likely to be a lot
less interesting at dinner parties from now on").
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speech is sometimes described as having devious purposes,
but the purpose has more to do with conveying distorted or
demagogic meanings, rather than avoidance of all
communicative content. The prose that arises in the
corporate setting characteristically aspires entirely to
defeat the ordinary purpose of speech-the exchange of
information or the promulgation of a viewpoint.8 5 Perhaps
the true language of business-one rich in expression and
interest-is the off-the-books speech, the private
interpretations of wise guys, the argot (often intensely
gendered), the gossip.8 6 Such grounded, informed, and
information-rich business speech as there is presumably
private. One might claim that the occluded nature of
corporate language is no accident-that those who hoard
the language, read it, and make it difficult to understand
have a power agenda. While the thesis is appealing, it
assigns a large element of intentionality to an evolution of
speech for a cultural setting. This paper embraces a view
that the speech adapts to the cultural artifact in which it
arises and takes a form shaped by the setting and the tasks.
4. Smith v. Van Gorkom-Positing Readers. The
canonical and yet contested case of Smith v. Van Gorkom87
captures the distressed relationship of narrative to
85. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1246
(2005) (stating that transactional lawyers may face a distinctive ethical
challenge because their stock in trade is the creative manipulation of legal form:
"[L]aw's wide tolerance of some divergence between legal form and economic
substance helps create a background assumption that such divergence is
normal and not problematic"). The creative manipulation of legal form has as a
primary purpose the creation of a bland surface and not a promulgation of a
strong message. Corporate text succeeds by draining away reader interest, not
by persuasion.
86. In "genre" analysis, there is examination of professional conventions
that are not readily communicated to those who have not already mastered
them, such as non-native English speakers. See John M. Swales, Occluded
Genres in the Academy: The Case of the Submission Letter, in ACADEMIC
WRITING 45 (Eija Ventola & Anna Mauranen eds., 1996); see also Uijay K.
Bahita, Genres and Styles in World Englishes, in THE HANDBOOK OF WORLD
ENGLISHES 391-92 (Braj B. Kachru, Cecil L. Nelson & Yamuna Kachru eds.,
2006) (comparing genres of writing according to the level of creativity permitted
in them and their consequent variation across cultures). Corporate writing has
little variation but also little in the way of communication, while more creative
speech about the corporation is likely to lack interpreters for any but those
already steeped in its code.
87. 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
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corporate law and corporate culture. In Van Gorkom, the
Delaware court attempted to construct a factual account of
a fast-breaking business deal and to write a rule about
proper board conduct in responding to deal offers. The
Delaware court has taken criticism for the failure of its
account of the deal as a convincing or helpful narrative.8 8
Interestingly, the case itself illustrates the attenuated
connection of an internal audience-the board of directors-
to an ongoing corporate "narrative."
One of the most salient facts that emerged from Van
Gorkom was the virtually universal neglect by corporate
players to read merger documents.8 9 One explanation is
that the text of the deal was located in the real literary
artifact-money. As an abstraction, the deal could be
communicated in price and structure; it did not have details
that a sophisticated set of readers would treat as a
narrative for them to monitor. The documents relating to a
mega deal do not have the power to transfix the most
trained corporate readers. Even those who might be
expected to be receptive to the uncluttered business
documents, often creating a deal involving many millions of
dollars, understand the text is not for reading. The
corporate readers in Van Gorkom understood and
manifested in their reading strategy that the narratives of
the deal were multiple, private, only partial, and heavily
displaced by (1) the raw appeal of dollars; (2) the business
premise that change is a guiding premise of business; and
(3) the understanding that corporate textual materials
mainly exist to fill the requirement for "the well-prepared,
the well-documented, the well-bound, and the unread."90 An
interpretation of Van Gorkom that restates a common
interpretation-that it deepens the need for management to
manage cosmetics 9 l-might take the form of saying that the
88. Id. at 897 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (referring to facts "explod[ing] like
popcorn"); see also William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and
Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 470 (1985) (referring to "factual
excess").
89. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
90. Auchincloss, supra note 70, at 367.
91. For a description of one line of attack on the process requirement of Van
Gorkom, see Lynn Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral
Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 675, 676 (2002) ("The second type of attack centers on what the business
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case was an effort to re-mask the convention of the unread
in the corporation. The Van Gorkom court takes the stance
that corporate text matters-its own legal text (with the
dissent differing sharply) and that of the corporation. Thus,
Van Gorkom briefly serves to expose the corporate
convention of the unread and then instates a ritual
readership for the sake of appearance. Our self-conception
remains culturally wedded to a functioning as readers, and
the process of acknowledging the evacuation of us
collectively from the status as readers vis-a-vis corporate
affairs prompted a protective judicial reaction symbolically
re-positioning us as readers. As a result of Van Gorkom,
companies have to provide much more paper. 92
In Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., a
Supreme Court case providing a faint echo of Van Gorkom,
the Court addressed the question of whether a federal judge
had actual knowledge, as a member of the board of Loyola
University, of a substantial deal ($6.69 million) between
Loyola and a litigant in a separate matter before his
court.93 The Court accepts the fact-finding below: although
the judge had been present at a meeting of the Board at
which the University's business interest in land was
discussed, he had no actual knowledge of the University's
interest in the land, which was subject to litigation in his
court, and thus no knowledge of his own fiduciary obligation
vis-A-vis a subject matter of the lawsuit.94 The Court
expresses a degree of astonishment at the judge's having
judgment rule does do-create incentives for directors to adopt elaborate and
costly decision-making routines (for example, scheduling longer meetings,
keeping detailed formal records of their determinations, and hiring expensive
outside consultants)."); see also id. at 676 n.5 (noting the derisive description of
Van Gorkom as the "investment bankers' full employment doctrine"). For
examples of commentary critical of Van Gorkom, see id. at 690-91 nn.55-58.
Bayless Manning, although critical of the case, wrote that "it is an
overstatement to consider the Van Gorkom case as the Investment Bankers'
Relief Act of 1985 ...." Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life
in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 3 (1985).
92. Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why
Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 631, 647 n.69 (2002)
(citing Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside
Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 28-29 (1989) (stating that after Van
Gorkom, general counsel recommended improving "the paper record of [Boards']
decisional process")).
93. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
94. See id. at 864.
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completely forgotten the business matter, which was of
some importance to the University. 95 The Court casts about
for a source of the obligation to read, or on the facts to listen
and pay attention (he forgot board discussions), and locates
it for the Court's purposes in the statute being applied, the
Judicial Code provision on judicial disqualification, 28
U.S.C. § 455.96
According to the Court, "Although [the judge] did not
know of his fiduciary interest in the litigation, he certainly
should have known. In fact, his failure to stay informed of
this fiduciary interest may well constitute a separate
violation of § 455. '' 97 Of further interest is the Court's
documentation, through reciting the facts, of an Article III
legal officer/Board member's approach to documents:
The details of the transaction were discussed in three letters to the
trustees dated March 12, 15, and 19, 1982, but Judge Collins did
not examine any of those letters until shortly before the Board
meeting on March 25, 1982. Thus, he acquired actual knowledge of
Loyola's interest in the litigation on March 24, 1982.98
In contrast to the majority's chastisement of the judge
for his inattention, including his inclination to postpone
examination of corporate documents until just before the
board meeting, Chief Justice Rehnquist offers judicial
recognition of a different view: that a board member's
postponement to the last minute of the task of reading
corporate documents is sufficiently ordinary as to be an
absolute bar to a claim that the board member should have
known of a conflict raised by the materials affecting his
other role of judge.99 The format of the majority opinion,
however, bears a resemblance to Van Gorkom: judicial
construction of evidence about board activity as conclusively
demonstrating board inattention (despite a formal norm
that board members should actively supervise), the
95. See id. at 865.
96. See id. at 868. Section 455(c) provides: "A judge should inform himself
about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable
effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and
minor children residing in his household." 28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (2000).
97. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 867-68.
98. Id. at 858.
99. See id. at 872-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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expression of shock, and the re-emphasizing of a formal
expectation of readership by board members. Although the
Supreme Court cites no corporate law, its citation of the
judicial code depends for plausibility on judicial installation
of a normative reader on corporate-style boards. Thus, like
Van Gorkom, Liljeberg both acknowledges, finding as fact,
the absenteeism of corporate readers and destabilizes the
finding as a representative fact by hypothesizing an
abstract corporate reader.
5. Enron: The Entire Class Gets Caught and We
Discover There Are No Readers for the Juiciest Corporate
Text.100 The most stunning illustration of the convention of
the unread in corporate texts is the mass dereliction of
everyone-investors, corporate participants, and, most of
all, business journalists-in the Enron debacle. 1 1 The
entire structure of readers of corporate text-in my
argument here, an empty dwelling-stands exposed. The
reasons that corporate observers offer are several. One
common claim is that the Enron text defeated readers. No
one had the readers' skills to decipher the reams of printed
matter distributed by Enron and posted on the
government's sites for corporate text. The SEC website
presupposes readers, yet the prime candidates for the
reading task-business journalists-have come forward to
confess. They write, but reading corporate text brings them
to the limits of their resources for absorption and
translation. "The whole thing was so opaque and so difficult
to conceive and so well hidden that it was just beyond the
tools of journalists."'1 2 Moreover, a journalist celebrated for
being the first to note in public "absence of crucial
information in [Enron's] financial reports"'1 3 continues with
her odd practice of noting informational holes by observing
100. McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 66, at 237-38 (describing the S & P
credit-rating analysts as claiming that Enron had duped them by not explaining
certain financial arrangements that amounted to disguised loans in meetings
and responding, when shown that Enron disclosed the items in public
disclosure, that "they had not read the document").
101. Short sellers were the conspicuous exception. See infra text at notes
105-06.
102. Felicity Barringer, 10 Months Ago, Questions on Enron Came and Went
With Little Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at All (quoting Mark Roberts,
research director of Off Wall Street Consulting in Cambridge, Mass.).
103. Id.
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the mismatch between the language of business, i.e.,
accounting, and the expectations of a reader. "'When you
come out of a liberal arts background,... you want to know
why something is the way it is.' In accounting, 'there is no
reason why. There is no fundamental truth underlying it.
It's just based on rules.'' 10 4 While accounting may be the
language of business, it seems fair to suggest that it is not a
language with a large expressive or communicative
capacity. But business readers have little record of
complaint, certainly not on the order of the possible readers
of other recondite languages, such as, for instance, aspiring
readers of jargon-ridden academic prose.
In the Enron example, the fascinating exception to the
high absenteeism among purported readers of corporate
disclosure was the investment communities' version of wise
guys, who trade in argot and the meaning of silence-the
short seller.'0 5 Enron stock had a large position of short
sellers. Arguably short sellers constitute the one set of
readers of corporate text with a finely tuned ear for the
variations in text that convey meaning within a convention
that drafts language for uses other than the conveyance of
meaning. Moreover, short sellers seek to occupy the
territory of private speech, gossip and shrewd guesses about
the unspoken. Short sellers are the Greek chorus of the
corporate world, cutting through the facade that posits
readers and writers where there is only the form of reading.
Are short sellers readers? It seems most correct to say they
read the situation and have good antennae for text that is
working to do more than merely to vindicate the convention
104. Id. (quoting Bethany McLean, author of the Fortune Magazine article
that raised early questions about Enron and about the absence of
comprehensibility of its accounting disclosure. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron
Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.).
105. Short sellers are investors who make money by betting that a stock
will go down, not up .... Short sellers tend to be a suspicious lot, and
as they looked closer they began to wonder about [debt created by a
failure of an Enron entity called Azurix with a guarantee of one billion
dollars of debt of an entity called Marlin] and about how Enron was
going to pay back that debt [which was revealed in public financial
disclosure]. They also started to wonder what the existence of that
strange Marlin structure and the flameout of Azurix suggested about
the rest of Enron.
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 66, at 258.
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of the unread. Short sellers detect that such overly occluded
text differs from standard corporate disclosure. It places an
opaque covering of incomprehensibility over more
information than the conventions of business language
ordinarily mask. The significance of opaque disclosure
becomes obvious to the short seller, who can distinguish the
opaque from the occluded and who is alerted by the
difference. The ordinary work of short sellers creates no
crisis of exposure and no need on the part of short sellers to
reposition other participants as readers, through a
restatement of norms of corporate readership, as the facts
of Van Gorkom did for judges in Delaware. Enron seems
likely to call for some sort of mass resolution to
demonstrate-to ourselves-that corporate text is readable
and is read. The documentary Enron: The Smartest Guys in
the Room 06 when it succeeds, conveys the brilliance of the
Enron "smart guys" in exploiting the collective fact that
corporate text lacks a readership by exploiting the
insecurity and credulity of everyone-bankers, analysts,
employees, journalists-with the intimation, wrapped in
intimidation, "If you don't understand it, we can't explain it
to you." In the usual case, faith in the organizational grasp
of a text that eludes readers but has a form created by
mutual dependency and entity logic that exclude the
personal works. The mostly ineffectual efforts to tell a story
grasp at opportunities in what Simmel refers to as the fact
that "the dependency of human beings upon each other [in a
money economy] has not yet become wholly objectified, and
personal elements have not yet been completely
excluded."'0 7 Hence, the documentary focuses on a con
about readership, the extravagant personal behavior of the
executives, especially Jeffrey Skilling and former CEO Lou
Pai, and the unreadability of the Enron financials. A key
image is the shredded papers, which might be thought to
hide revelations, but in truth represent the ultimate visual
depiction of the general reader's relationship to corporate
text. The shredded text, though in truth an occluded form of
text that may well have had little import if publicly printed
and disseminated, becomes a symbol of a lost chance to read
corporate text.
106. ENRON: THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE ROOM (Magnolia Pictures 2005).
107. SIMMEL, supra note 67, at 296.
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B. The Relative Absence of Characters from the Body of
Corporate Law
Corporate life and governance are human
interactions. 108 Nonetheless, the law that reflects more than
a century of corporate affairs produces little in the way of
characters whose doings and sayings are the subject or the
fulcrum of narratives. A salient exception is Henry Ford,
whose personality, philosophy, and specific statements
about his corporate purposes with respect to capital,
workers, and consumers are located in a rich set of texts.10 9
The extent to which he serves as a character in a story
about corporate governance shows, by contrast, the usual
108. Among the stronger intimations in corporate law scholarship of the
human nature of the board are efforts under the rubric of behavioral law and
economics to address features of human nature as they affect the functioning of
a board and to potentially suggest useful legal doctrines to provide direction for
good board conduct. See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate
Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 438 (2001) (arguing that directors have
internalized beliefs that serve the purpose of trustworthy behavior).
109. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (celebrated
demonstration of Henry Ford's ego in a legal setting). Books about Ford have
been published for almost a century, both lionizing him as a hero and critiquing
him as a powerful eccentric. Among the books are RUDOLF ALVARADO & SONYA
ALVARADO, DRAWING CONCLUSIONS ON HENRY FORD (2001); JONATHAN A. BROWN,
HENRY FORD (2005); MICHAEL BURGAN, HENRY FORD: AN INDUSTRIAL GIANT
(2002); ROGER BURLINGAME, HENRY FORD: A GREAT LIFE IN BRIEF (1955); ANNE
JARDIM, THE FIRST HENRY FORD: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY AND BUSINESS
LEADERSHIP (1970); BEVERY RAE KIMES, THE CARS THAT HENRY FORD BUILT: A
COMMEMORATIVE TRIBUTE TO AMERICA'S MOST REMEMBERED AUTOMOBILES
(2005); DAVID LANIER LEWIS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF HENRY FORD: AN AMERICAN
FOLK HERO AND HIS COMPANY (1976); WILLIAM C. RICHARDS, THE LAST
BILLIONAIRE, HENRY FORD (1948); WILLIAM LE ROY STIDGER, HENRY FORD: THE
MAN AND HIS MOTIVES (1923); KEITH SWARD, THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD (1948);
DONN PAUL WERLING, HENRY FORD: A HEARTHSIDE PERSPECTIVE (2000); JEFFREY
ZUEHLKE, HENRY FORD (2007). This list of books demonstrates that Henry Ford
became a major cultural presence for Americans, and as such he occupied an
important place in the American consciousness in connection with many aspects
of the politics and culture of the country. Whether there is a narrative about
Henry Ford that provides an account of business logic or law is harder to say.
To read all the writing about Henry Ford and summarize what sort of narrative
it contains would be a daunting task. It seems likely, however, that much of the
narrative is about a striking person who made himself a public figure as a
result of his genius for manufacturing automobiles in the early twentieth
century.
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impoverishment of the corporate texts as a setting for
characters and their motivations and impact. In addition,
the manner in which his status as a character confounded a
legal outcome suggests the disruptive effect on the
conventions of corporate law that the emergence of a
narrative with a character at the center could create. Ford
famously lost Dodge v. Ford"o because he insisted, too
publicly, on personal vision, 11' and the court had to remind
him that Ford Motor Company was a business corporation.
Dodge v. Ford is a case that embodies the transition of the
corporation from a "man's" business, with an assertion that
a man's character is embedded in its governing logic,1 2 to a
public, bureaucratic, impersonal company deriving its legal
rationale and its governing constraints from its status as an
artificial person. The inconvenience and ultimate
unmanageability of the disruption to the abstraction of the
corporation creates law that is discounted for precedential
effect. In the usual corporate case, there is no assertion of
personal belief to unmask the depersonalizing premises of
the entity. When a personality asserts its presence, the law
is explained away for having had too much to do with what
a character said and did; the baldness of Ford's agency and
the connection of a story about a whole person to a legal
outcome cannot be absorbed into corporate law. There is no
place to put Henry Ford in the accounts of corporate law,
and perhaps less than one might think in cultural
reference. Though there is substantial cultural interest in
Henry Ford, with due attention to negative features of his
political and social beliefs, 1 3 the larger meaning of his
biography is unclear.
Other parts of the law record and interpret stories
concerning who did and said what; it is a rare corporate
case that contains a quotation. When they do, they are
remembered. Henry Ford embodied vanity when he
testified that he wished to aid the workingman by making
110. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
111. For Ford's assertion about his personal business creed, see HENRY
FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 19-20 (1922).
112. See infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., NEIL BALDWIN, HENRY FORD AND THE JEWS: THE MASS
PRODUCTION OF HATE (2001).
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more cars more affordable. 114 In a lesser known case, a
corporate disputant made a critical admission when he
testified that he was merely curious to see the list of his
fellow shareholders and did not know what he would do
with it. 1 15 In State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., the
implicit words of a motivated and principled shareholder,
understood to concede a motive apart from profit when a
pretext would have done, critically damaged his chance for
success in court. 116 In cases where corporate actors are
actually quoted, their words linger-by contrast to the bulk
of corporate law. The pleasure of the rare narrative,
recalling that narrative in its basic sense concerns what
characters say and do, intrudes on the body of corporate law
and brings a smile to those accustomed to interpreting the
predominating texture of corporate law. In addition, the
breaking out of personality often turns the law toward a
conclusion that is left to stand as an anomaly from which
generalization is difficult. 117
In addition to the problematic status of specific
individuals in the corporation as characters, the
shareholder as a role has lost a sense of embodiment or
complexity."18  With the exception of raiders, the
shareholder plays no role that can be well captured by a
story of characters and what they say and do. Rather, the
shareholder serves nicely as a disembodied force
handsomely captured by scientific language presupposing a
set of actions and reactions."19
114. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
115. Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570
(Del. 1997) (rejecting demand for shareholder list because plaintiff "admitted
that he had no idea what he would do with such a list").
116. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn.
1971).
117. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1986); Dodge, 170
N.W. at 671; Pillsbury, 191 N.W.2d at 407.
118. See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 39 (2000) ("The most abiding vision of shareholders in public
companies in the 20th century was one-dimensional.")
119. See William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for
Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997) (applying economic language
to the debate over charter competition).
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C. Abstraction: Lost in Time
Corporate law tends not to contain reference to
sequence, does not present vivid characters, lacks a sense of
place, and shies away from theories of cause and effect.
Foundationally, corporate law disclaims any search for
cause in the basic plot development business can produce-
the business failure. 120 Much of corporate law exists outside
any sense of chronology. Stock has characteristics,
shareholders have rights, management has authority. The
most specific concern with chronology in the public
corporation occurs with respect to progressive law
arguments about the time-specific investment of labor in an
enterprise for which the return, it is argued, must be
institutional loyalty,121 efficiency arguments for golden
parachutes, 122 and the court-written accounts of periods of
negotiation and confrontation in takeovers. 123 In close
corporations, participants offer chronologies, which the
courts give more or less voice to as official narratives of
business life and co-venturer duties. 24 Yet the role of
chronology is always at risk from the legal significance of
the abstracted corporate form. Likewise, settings are mostly
irrelevant: interactions are not given a narrative weight or
portent by their location. 25 The corporation is not at any
120. Leading cases that articulate the rule that directors are not responsible
for bad outcomes or for bad judgment include Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885
(2d Cir. 1982); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968);
and Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). For
an argument that the business judgment rule should stand for a rule of judicial
abstention from consideration of the decisions of corporate directors except in
narrowly circumscribed exceptions, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business
Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
121. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus
of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
122. See William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the
Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385,
420-21 (1988).
123. See Rock, supra note 4, at 1028-59.
124. See Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 5 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989);
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
125. The signing of deal papers, described in Smith v. Van Gorkom, at the
intermission of the Lyric Opera is an exception, although narrative techniques
are not used in the case to create narrative tension. 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del.
1985). The place is used to suggest a casual approach to business details, but it
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particular place in the legal imagination: it is a set of
transactions. It is "a situation without any specific time or
place."126
D. The Resistance of Corporate Law to Critique and the
Perfection of the Abstract Logic of Corporate Law
Largely, the doctrines of corporate law exhaust
themselves with solutions to economic questions. In a
somewhat assertive way, corporate law generally insists on
separating questions of human personality from questions
of economics. 127 In this way, corporate law and the related
is not in truth a setting that carries narrative purpose. When a business
transaction is occurring, the description of where is wooden, since the physical
location does not play any role in the business logic that drives the interaction.
For the business transaction, the truism-everybody has to be somewhere-
means that location is inconsequential.
126. WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 97.
127. Even without adopting the perspective of law and economics, which is
criticized by the proponents of socioeconomics as underanalyzing the
interpersonal dimension of economic exchange, see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Law and Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 226 (1999), law about the
corporation places little reliance on insights about human personality. Indeed,
the business judgment rule accords to directors a rare exemption from
assumptions of self-interested behavior; in the normal case, directors are
assumed to act on the basis of institutional interest and not with regard for
their own maximization. It is commonplace to say that the business judgment
rule presumes that directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 269 (citing cases that recite the formula). The
fact of their ordinary human embodiment and concern for enrichment is
recognized in the effort to purchase their loyalty with golden parachutes, see
Carney, supra note 122, at 421-22, and in the concern that stock option
compensation may dilute their loyalty during a takeover scenario. See id. at
423. But the price paid is simply given to reinforce the plausibility of the
normative treatment of them as human repositories of institutional motives.
There is little retail treatment of the individuals, the bargaining for loyalty, and
the true price of loyal conduct, except for relatively abstract economic theories
of the utility of compensation to managers. See id. at 416-23. Shareholders have
less potential than directors to assert personality and command even less overt
attention in their human particulars; they assert themselves in disembodied
market transactions or in voting by proxy. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Revisiting
the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Obligations, 25 J.
CORP. L. 209, 214 (2000) (referring to votes of disinterested shareholders in
conflict of interest transactions as "sanitized consent"); see also Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1403, 1406, 1413 (critiquing the treatment of shareholders in public
corporations as involved in a bargain and arguing that it is "erroneous to use
the term 'contract' to describe dispersed stockholders' relation to the 'original
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scholarship are less intellectually ambitious than broad
theories of society and law.128 But despite its narrow gauge
of concern, corporate law, and particularly business law,
sprawls, drawing in logic and discourse relating to form, 129
a recondite language, 130 finance theory and terminology,' 31
economic incentives and human motives, 32 the rudiments
owner' or to corporate management" and discussing the limited information
provided to shareholders when they vote).
128. The intellectual ambitions and complexity of Peter Drucker, who takes
on the study of the modern organization and the corporation as the site for the
study of the condition of the human being in relation to work, with concern and
"insight ... not into trade but into manners and the human psyche," JACK
BEATTY, THE WORLD ACCORDING To PETER DRUCKER 142 (1998), can be
contrasted with the concerns of corporate law with economic return. When
classic corporate law has fretted about the legitimacy of managerial power, it
has done so with primary attention to the justification of management's control
over investors' capital-other people's money being the summarizing phrase.
The phrase, other people's money, is taken from the title of a book by Louis
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). The
phrase originated in Brandeis's concern with corporate power being amassed by
combinations through sinister types of collusion but came to stand generally for
the control over investments exercised by corporate management. By contrast,
Peter Drucker postulates a concern with power in a much broader sense of
power over the routine conditions of human lives and the sources of satisfaction
that are affected by one's calling. See PETER DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE
ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER 28 (1993) (describing the question of our time
as: "[O]n what basis of values and beliefs, and to what purpose are the problems
of the enterprise to be solved?"). He is concerned with the matter of "the
necessary social sanction to serve as the integrating nucleus of the postwar
industrial society." BEATTY, supra, at 131. At least as an overt matter, corporate
law is not concerned with such broad issues of societal health. Even progressive
corporate law, which looks at issues of trust, does so in service to an interest in
economic justice more than in the effect of the corporate enterprise on the
human personality. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra notel21.
129. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures:
Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAW. 109, 109
(2004) (examining different contexts that present the question of when the law
should disrespect corporate form in favor of substance).
130. For a discussion of the disjunction between the language of the
corporation and that of language spoken by corporate actors in their personal
lives, see Johnson, supra note 45.
131. See id. at 5 (referring to "the financial/economic vocabulary that has so
powerfully shaped corporate theory since the 1970s").
132. Langevoort, supra note 108. The literature on management's choice of
the state of incorporation is overtly about human motive: the possible
preference of managers for state corporate laws that permit management the
freest hand in running the corporation to their own personal advantage rather
than for the good of the shareholders. If literal, one can imagine mangers
plotting to select states that loosen the rules, and finding ways to communicate
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of plot and character,133 and a large range of organizational
types, 134 functions, and problems. 135 Even with its sprawl,
corporate law has a tight doctrinal core.
As a logical construct, corporate law resists critique.
The tool of narrative, often effective to reconfigure a
governing narrative, lacks power to dilute the logic of
corporate law. If critiqued as arid by lay readers and non-
specialists among lawyers, the governing model gains
power with the perfection of its abstract logic. The
fascination that money has over the imagination
impoverishes imagination about the making of money and
leaves business an empty narrative category. 136 The site for
the making of money lacks interest compared with the
central literary trope of money itself. As such it occupies a
point in the mind of abstraction-where human
interactions produce a result that overpowers
interpretations of the human motives, disappointments,
and causes and effects. Business produces wealth, in part
from the rejection of the role of narrative as a preservation
of social understanding, a snapshot of reality. The
blackmail threats of reincorporation elsewhere if the state rules are not kept
weak. The literature does not generally have that quality. The principal
exposition of the argument is typified by Carney. See Carney, supra note 122.
133. See Ringling Wrangling: Three Sets of Heirs Squabble for Control of the
Circus, infra note 169.
134. A good comprehensive treatment of the types of organization that have
assumed a roughly corporate form is contained in ALFRED CONARD,
CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 2-11 (1976) (describing the "multiplicity" of
corporation codes and the phenomenon of special purpose corporations).
135. A good overview of the predominating methods and, in fact, language of
corporate scholarship that emphasizes economic argumentation and finance
theory is provided by FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAw (Roberta Romano ed.,
1993).
136. This is not to say there are not individual narratives constructed about
a particular business and its connection to the lives of those constructing and
nurturing the narrative. But such narratives are fragile and have little power to
prevail over the ultimate fascination with money. The book about the RJR-
Nabisco takeover generated many vignettes and quotes that crystallized the
cultural triumph of money as cultural symbol over business as narrative. An
employee of RJR Nabisco who refused to move from Winston-Salem to New
York captured the point: "I don't feel like I work for a company anymore . . . I
work for an investment." BURROUGHS & HELYAR, supra note 76, at 511. The
comment is more than a narrative statement about historical trends in finance
and takeover logic. It is also a deeper comment on the weakness of narrative
about business as a cultural icon compared with the excitement attendant on a
market for businesses as engines of wealth.
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imagination is content with the power of the idea and
unmoved by the stories under the surface. The idea does not
need stories to sustain its logic.
The result is the predominance of a model of corporate
law that transcends narrative categories or concrete
language and that has a cultural certainty highly resistant
to any effort to'alter its explanatory and rationalizing
principles. The leading corporate scholars can say with
justification and with confidence, "There is no longer any
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value."'137 The authors argue that efficiency and the force of
logic are key factors pointing toward a convergence in
corporate law that eliminate competing models. 138 Further,
it has become commonplace that "state corporate law is an
empty shell that has form but no content."'139 Professor
Bayless Manning long ago explained that corporations, as
economic enterprises, lack significant personal
relationships.140 While large social narratives may not
require personal relationships, there is little evidence of a
compelling social narrative, other than wealth as an end,
that holds the place of narratives anchored to the element
of the personal.
The minimalism of state corporate law suggests the
lack of compelling narrative to which to respond. While the
shorthand explanation for the emptiness of state law is
competition for charters that erodes state law, 4 1 the lack of
content nonetheless remains a marker for the corporate
enterprise. The social accomplishment of emptying out
content may have local explanations, but the match of the
corporate undertaking for form without content is an
137. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law 1 (Harvard Law Sch., Paper No. 280, 2000), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/corporate-governance/papers
JNo.280.00.Hansmann-Kraakman.pdf.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990).
140. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 230 (1962) (describing the trend, consistent
with general trends in law, "to relegate the shareholder's claim of 'ownership' to
the status of a fungible dollar claim").
141. See Black, supra note 139, at 548-49.
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overriding fact of global import. The enterprise has a deep
form that makes practicable and likely the effacement of
social comprehensibility and the loss of persuasiveness
provided by legal narratives tied to a theory of regulation.
E. The Transformation of Gender in Corporate Cases from a
Trope of Manhood to an Irrelevancy
In 1879, a court called the board of directors a
"constituted body of men clothed with the corporate
powers."'142 Today, boards are called "human capital,"'143 a
usage designed to draw attention away from individuals
and toward a functional component of the corporate entity.
"Internal team governance structures" constrain board
misconduct. 144 Gender has gradually disappeared from
corporate cases, which are written as though the world has
in fact begun to function as a gender-free zone in which
those who fill roles are only incidentally male or female.
Popular culture produces commentary on the persistence of
gendered interactions in the corporation, 145 but corporate
law has no apparatus for recognizing gender as relevant to
corporate law. Some recent writings attempt to undo the
invisibility of gender as a category in corporate law by
addressing how the culture of the corporation is gendered,
including law review symposia on women and the
corporation. 146 It is not yet clear whether such writings
142. Baldwin v. Canfield, 1 N.W. 261, 270 (Minn. 1879).
143. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New
Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 335 (2007), citing William
R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622 (2006) (discussing the loss of
"the most qualified human capital" and the resulting inefficiency when
prosecutorial power discourages board service).
144. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 266.
145. See, e.g., Johnny Roberts & Evan Thomas, Enron's Dirty Laundry,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2002, at 22, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/540
5918/site/newsweek! (stating that the Enron scandal has been told as "a battle
of the sexes").
146. The Maryland Law Review has recently done a symposium issue on
women and the corporation, see Symposium, Women and the "New" Corporate
Governance, 65 MD. L. REV. 301 (2006), and St. John's Law Review did one on
people of color, women, and the public corporation, see Symposium, People of
Color, Women, and the Public Corporation, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV., 887 (2005). In
addition, there is a recent book: DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, No SEAT AT THE TABLE:
How CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM
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have any potential to strip away the surface gender
neutrality of corporate logic, or whether they are simply a
form of social commentary about one venue in which the
social progress of women can be assessed.
The observation follows the form of similar observations
about the replacement of personalities with bureaucracy in
the expression of power. The replacement of personality by
system necessarily displaces narrative and occludes gender
as social narrative or a basis for authority. The law has
created categories for rationalizing and superintending
corporate power that avoid deployment of the continuing
force of gender as a wellspring of authority. The category is
suppressed, not necessarily as an intentional strategy, but
because, whatever its social power, it lacks conceptual
relevance to corporate power or economic principles. The
four stories of Enron told by Bill Bratton in his important
law review treatment of the scandal have no story of
gender, despite the prominence of the gender subtext in
popular accounts. 147 A feminist argument for narrative
might claim that the law justifies in neutral language forms
of personal dominance that are detectable in the unvoiced
narratives suggested by case facts. Cases are at hand in
which a narrative can be built out of the materials in the
court's un-narrated but linguistically mandated
acknowledgment of the sex of the litigants. Examples
include S. L. & E. v. Lewis, in which a group of brothers
behaving as the majority interest treats the interests of a
family corporation with only a subset of sisters and one
brother as identical to the interests of a family corporation
with all the family members. 148 But whatever stories
happen in the corporation that demonstrate the social
(2006); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in
the Boardroom: Just How Far Have You Come, Baby? (Wayne State Univ. Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper, Series No. 07-17, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=985339 (suggesting that gender and ethnic diversity
may aid monitoring by helping foster a culture of dissent on boards); Joan
MacLeod Hemmingway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards (Working Paper,
2006) (asserting that gender diversity on boards contributes value but is
difficult to achieve).
147. Compare Bratton, supra note 17, at 1286, with Roberts & Thomas,
supra note 145, at 22. See also Westbrook, supra note 17, at 86 (the
conventional story about Enron as a breakdown) and 97 (the story retold as
managers acting in the interests of shareholders).
148. S. L. & E., Inc. v. Lewis, 629 F.2d 764, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980).
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power of gender, they are engulfed by the conceptual power
of the abstraction of the corporation, and they do not
emerge in the canon of corporate law as a relevant category,
nor do they function in a critical narrative about corporate
doctrine. The fact of gender adds no usable conceptual
materials to corporate law. Gender has no power at all to
explain the outcomes of corporate cases and none to inform
the judgment of the corporate jurist.
The invisibility of gender in the cases might be seen in
narrative terms as a form of dominance, a character that
dominates by her absence, or at any rate the case of the
missing trope. The glass ceiling is a feature of corporations,
for example, but it has nothing to do with corporate law as
a social enterprise or with the study of corporate
governance. Yet, if the circumstance of women or "women's
voice" has no place in imagining the corporation, neither
does the concept of manhood. If men dominate the
corporation, nothing about men or maleness informs the
contemporary social/legal understanding of corporate law or
practice. Yet, social history suggests that understandings
about "manliness," or virtue, once played a role in cultural
understandings of business propriety, and of the expected
behavior of businessmen. 149
As noted, the absence of gender as a feature of
reasoning about the corporation is placed in sharp relief by
comparison with older corporate law. Cases in the past
often took a turn to a rhetoric of manhood when the courts
sought a firm basis for a holding or a rationale. The
imperatives of manhood supplied certitude. The figure of
"men" held large sway. For example, "the addition of these
qualified men would, under other circumstances, be . . .
appropriate ."15 An idea of character, implicitly
connected to an ideal of manliness, figured: depositors have
a right to "rely upon the character of the directors and
officers . . . that they will ... devote to its affairs the same
diligent attention which ordinary, prudent, diligent men
pay to their own affairs . 151 The dignity of men who
served in corporations was at stake in legal determinations:
149. See, e.g., KWOLEK-FOLLAND, supra note 50, at 45-49 (explaining evolving
views of manly character appropriate to success in business).
150. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 656 (Del. Ch. 1988).
151. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
2007]
582 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
"Men's fortunes may not be subjected to such uncertain and
speculative conjectures." 152 Business men had knowledge
associated with their manliness and character as
businessmen, traces of which have appeared in dissents
relatively recently: "These men knew Trans Union like the
back of their hands and were more than well qualified to
make on the spot informed business judgments . . . [and]
[t]hese men were at the time an integral part of that world,
all professional business men, not intellectual
figureheads."'153 The association of maleness with the
underlying moral logic of the corporation was once common
and unreflective. 154
The evolution of corporate law to gender-neutral
language, while consistent with a general trend in the
culture and in legal writing, underlines the
depersonalization of corporate law and the suitability of the
corporation for a language that drains away human
narratives in favor of an entity focus, in which the
corporation as a legal person displaces other personal
152. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
153. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 895 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
154. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) ("[T]o say
that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis .... ); Memphis & C.R. Co. v.
Wood, 7 So. 108, 113 (Ala. 1889) ("[W]hen one man stands in a fiduciary
relation to another, any contract or bargain and sale had with the beneficiary is
invalid at the mere option of the latter, if seasonably expressed."); Cookies Food
Prod. v. Lakes Warehouse, 430 N.W.2d 447, 454 (Iowa 1988) (referring to
majority shareholder as Duane "Speed" Herrig, quoting the board as noting that
"he was the driving force in the corporation's success," and asserting that "he
has done the work of at least five people"); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659,
661 (Mass. 1933) ("Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so
onerous that men of experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such
office .... On the other hand, directors cannot rightly be allowed to indulge
with impunity in practices which do violence to prevailing standards of upright
business men."); Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A
Belated Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1724, 1737 (1995) ('You might as well ask the clouds in the air to propel
the railroad locomotives. The stockholders are multitudinous, widely scattered,
many of them women and estates. They give their proxies to whomsoever is in
control- blindly and automatically . . . . They are derelicts adrift on an
unknown sea, without chart, compass, landmark or pilot."' (quoting William W.
Cook, A Plan for the Nationalization of Railroads, 24 YALE L.J. 370, 374
(1915))); Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36-43 (1966) ("[Elven though they might
not be the same men as sat on the board of the parent corporation.").
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narrative. One can imagine narratives of collectives, such
as nations, that deploy recognizably gendered characters-
father figures, iron maidens, and politicians' consorts. The
iconic figures within collectives that are not themselves
persons can function in a narrative in which gender still
figures. Thus, something about the corporate form defeats
our remaining and still hardy concern with gender. In
popular culture, men are from Mars and women are from
Venus, but in the corporation, executives are from the
market for executives. The corporation and its legal
interpreters have "no imagination" about gender as a
feature of the institutional apparatus and the legal review
of risk. Risk is a quantifiable feature of investments rather
than a story about male energy or personal will associated
with men.
Before the entity and its investment profile became the
dominating person in the legal imagination, the business
man presented by the incipient judicial narrators of
corporate law and culture was a distinctly gendered figure,
with all that gender signaled. "Men" constituted a
conceptual wedge for a moral element in the cases, directed
at an implicit narrative about a code of behavior or ethics.
In the early cases, it was possible to make confident
assertions about "the businessman," or "prevailing
standards of upright business men,"155 and "[m]en's
fortunes,"156 and thereby to imply something human
situated in cultural understanding about a good society and
its human constituents. The WASP male, with a certain
ethos and morality could have his behavior judged (in
literal terms) by his social peers in accordance with a
human (cultural) standard. The corporate board as "the
constituted body of men clothed with . . . corporate
powers,"'157 was imagined as recognizable individuals who,
in their humanity and status as carriers of cultural
meaning, created a distinctive authority arising from their
combination; the nineteenth century board was a collective
but with human constituents that gave it a meaning partly
derived from individual characteristics with cultural
specific referents. This assumption that the corporation was
155. Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661.
156. Barnes, 298 F. at 617.
157. Baldwin v. Canfield, 1 N.W. 261, 270 (1879).
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grounded in its culturally specific human members was
sometimes quite specific: depositors have the right to "rely
upon the character of the directors and officers that they
will devote to its affairs the same diligent attention which
ordinary, prudent, diligent men pay to their own affairs."158
Language about "men" and their character is foreign to
corporate discourse today, which focuses on the functions of
due care, process, accountability, and the installation of
defensible systems of monitoring. The language of the cases
today is so clearly functional that cultural markers of the
personality, such as manhood, have fallen away. The
contemporary manager/director/shareholder is not human,
not even a "businessperson." Explanations of the business
judgment rule argue that "team-specific human capital"
creates dynamics that make judgments about individuals
impractical. Human capital is a resource of an entity and
not a fit subject for stories and consequent judgment about
individuals.
By contrast, cases from the past demonstrated an
understanding that corporate law was about the affairs of
"men," whose culturally expressed masculinity carried
forward a portion of the cultural understanding that
generated legal conclusions and judicial understandings. 159
The cultural confidence judges needed to draw conclusions
came from a culture of manhood and is not present in
corporate law today. The usage that openly assumed a
gendered world and hence a gendered business law-the
trope of manhood-has disappeared and been supplanted
by formal role explained by abstract understandings of
efficiency rather than the manhood of businessmen.
Economic theory at an abstract level has sufficient power to
supplant the power of male authority.
So cases today overlook the gender of the participants,
both in terms of assigning significance to their gender and
in terms of narrative conventions that trigger narrative
tension. Only a determined reader may assign significance
to the gender of the participants that the judicial authors do
not explore or even foreground with narrative tension. The
cases are written for a world of gender neutrality, in which
disembodied economic actors go their maximizing way.
158. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
159. See KWOLEK-FOLLAND, supra note 50, at 41-69.
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Feminists are wrong to suggest corporate law contains the
materials for the construction of narratives of gender about
corporate law but the absence of gender is a critical marker
of the corporate form as a category that defies the insertion
of human factors. Again, the entity contains a cauldron of
human emotions, but they are nothing more than vignettes
unconnected to the cognizable discourse of the corporation,
understood either as a formal legal construct or as a set of
social meanings that those who live in corporations can
articulate. Hence, in the corporation, there can be talk
investing interpersonal relationships with subterranean
import, and water cooler talk explaining internal dynamics,
but the talk is ephemeral and wandering.
Indeed, the power of the entity as a conceptual magnet
is such that popular treatments of business foregrounding
gender make little headway in assigning it a coherent place
in the account of business. Tom Wolfe reports:
In the year 2000, it was standard practice for the successful chief
executive officer of a corporation to shuck his wife of two to three
decades' standing for the simple reason that her subcutaneous
packing was deteriorating, her shoulders and upper back were
thickening like a shot-putter's-in short, she was no longer
sexy. 160
Enron, naturally, that moment of cultural revelation,
brought forth trenchant observations on gender.16 1
According to a successful producer of investigative
journalism, the cinematic framing for the story is the fact
that, "'It's about the women up against the men.'' 162 Noting
160. TOM WOLFE, HOOKING UP 6 (2000).
161. Robert Bryce offers "the sexual shenanigans" of Enron executives as
one theory of what went wrong. ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND
THE DEATH OF ENRON 11 (2002).
162. Maureen Dowd, Barbie Loves Math, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A21
(quoting Lowell Bergman, former "60 Minutes" producer). For more details of
the popular culture narrative about sex in Enron, implicitly connected to the
business outcome, see Roberts & Thomas, supra note 145:
At Treasures, a "gentleman's club" in Houston, the strippers began to
look for the flash of an Enron credit card. "That's like having a
platinum card," one stripper told NEWSWEEK. "If it's an Enron guy,
they got money." (Or did.) In the high-rolling days, Enron traders on
their lunch break would buy a bottle of Cristal champagne (up to $575)
and repair upstairs to the "VIP Room." The Treasures manager, who
identified himself as 'Mitch," said he was "unaware" of sexual favors
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the emerging theme that women were the principal whistle
blowers and skeptical outsiders in the Enron course of
events, 163 the trenchant columnist Maureen Dowd describes
the "slicked-back Gordon Gekko C.E.O. and his arrogant
coterie in the Houston skyscraper-where men were wont
to mess around and to leave wives for secretaries-
dismiss[ing] female critics.' 16 4 She writes that "[s]ome men
suggest that women, with their vast experience with male
blarney, are experts at calling guys on it. '165 The
revelations and gender lineup of Enron hints at a gender
narrative that gives form to corporate life and underpins
the empirical assertions of power in corporations and
sustains business energy. Yet it also reveals that providing
being bestowed in the VIP Room. Said a stripper: "If a guy's going to
pay you $1,000, use your imagination."
Sex suffused the Enron atmosphere. Skilling divorced his wife and
became engaged to an Enron secretary, whom he promoted to a
$600,000 job and whom insiders immediately dubbed "Va Voom!" One
top executive, Lou Pai, divorced his wife and married a former stripper.
Several women who were believed to be sleeping with their bosses were
called "The French Lieutenants' Women." Staffers fearful of the next
rank-and-yank session worried that these women were acting as spies.
The most celebrated affair was between two top executives, Ken Rice
and Amanda Martin. Their affection, described by Enron staffers to
NEWSWEEK as "touchy feely" and "obscene," was visible through the
windows of Martin's office.
It is worth noting that Newsweek issued the following correction:
In our March 11 article on Enron ("Enron's Dirty Laundry"), we
incorrectly reported that former CEO Jeffrey Skilling was "engaged to
an Enron secretary [Rebecca Carter], whom he promoted to a $600,000
job." In fact, she was elected 'Corporate Secretary' by the company's
board of directors. Ms. Carter, who has a master's degree in
accounting, had previously served in several senior-level positions at
Enron, including senior vice president. NEWSWEEK regrets the error.
Roberts & Thomas, supra note 145.
163. See, e.g., Dan Schneider, Review of ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM, May 14, 2006, http://www.cosmoetica.com/B371-DES310.htm ("The first
to catch on to the con was Bethany McLean, a soft-spoken, attractive, and very
feminine reporter for Fortune magazine, who brought out the first questions
about the company after the 2000 Dot.com collapses.").
164. Dowd, supra note 162, at A21. The National Enquirer also attempted to
fashion a narrative out of gender to attract reader interest. See Enron: The
Untold Story, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Feb. 15, 2002 (calling Enron "a 'sin city' of greed,
adultery and corruption where top executives lived the high life-and ordinary
investors lost their shirts"), available at http://www.nationalenquirer.
com/crime/21010#.
165. Dowd, supra note 162, at A21.
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a narrative shape to the gender "subtext" of the corporation
in any way that attaches to either probable legal
conclusions or a systematic understanding of the
relationship between conventions of the corporation and
gender as an explanatory construct is a conceptual dead
end. On paper, the corporation is a perfectly ungendered
world, in which roles are only formal and the individuals
have arrived at a state of androgynous nirvana. Again, the
corporation does not support the production of successful
narrative.
F. Implications
The implications of the claim about the marginality of
narrative in corporate law are polarized and abundant and
convenient to entirely inconsistent conclusions. Critics of
corporate "domination" likely would see the insight as proof
of the alienating implications of the large corporation. 16 6 A
contrasting view is that the predominant academic theories
of corporate law as a sphere of economic efficiency are
superior to insight not disciplined and given general power
by a rigorous model, replete with necessary assumptions, of
a distinctively abstract sphere of activity. 167 Yet the lack of
narrative is only a neutral fact about business, and the
related legal and popular writing about business, and thus
describing it constitutes neither a critique nor an apology.
The neutrality of the point cuts two ways-it does not claim
that corporations are good or bad, and it does not suggest
166. For a popular view imagining that the Enron narrative "proves"
problems with the free market and the corporate form, see Schneider, supra
note 163 ("If this film does not prove, once and for all, that the glorious myth of
the free market, and Adam Smith's invisible hand, is a fraud, nothing will.").
167. Stephen Bainbridge provides a good example of a rich set of writings
that create explanations based on economic efficiency and are addressed to the
explanation of abstractions rather than to the fine-grained texture of corporate
life. Recent examples include Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism:
A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 877 (1997); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735
(2006) (presenting a set of economic arguments refuting Professor Bebchuk's
proposals to give shareholders greater ability to initiate changes in corporate
governance); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommittment Strategies in Corporate
Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2002).
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that narrative can reform the corporation by humanizing it
or help to explain it to critics. Hence, the assertion lacks a
utility for the emotional investment of scholars or general
observers in a point of view.
There are some grounds to argue that corporate cases
do contain high drama and riveting figures and implicit
intrigue. Obvious examples are Ringling Brothers-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling168 and Bayer v.
Beran.16 9 Further, corporate law contains grand social
narratives-meta-narratives (of which Berle and Means are
the primary instance)-about the relationship between the
suppliers of capital and the managerial class, as well as
treatments of the history of the corporation. The problem
with the first is that in corporate law classes, there is little
evidence that the background stories about family intrigue,
as in the fallout from the catastrophic Ringling Brothers
circus fire, 170 engage students with the subject of voting
agreements or with the effect on family dynamics on
corporate conflict. Claims about sweeping historical
interpretations as narrative have some real merit, but
historical narrative is somewhat marginalized in the
academy and is not executed in a way that connects a story
of social trends to corporate rules.
The observation that corporate law is distinctly
inhospitable to narrative has an organizing power for the
field in revealing that the marginal status of narrative in
corporate law is a good fit for the project of corporate law.
Features of corporate law might be seen in a fresh light
with a recognition of its evolution as a body of knowledge in
which the narrative component may have ebbed. Some may
conclude that the attenuated character of narrative in
corporate law, if established, would be a useful insight in
support of change, because it might suggest the usefulness
of narrative interventions to provide a richer human
168. 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947) (concerning the enforceability of a
shareholders' voting agreement, with a backdrop of a famous circus, a tragic
fire, and family dynamics).
169. 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (concerning a claim about a failure of a
board of directors to exercise their business judgment about the expenditure of
corporate funds to permit a corporate spouse to record singing commercials).
170. Ringling Wrangling. Three Sets of Heirs Squabble for Control of the
Circus, FORTUNE, July 1947, at 114.
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context for the corporation. 171 Hope that a conscious
attention to narrative openings in corporate law and
scholarship have promise, either as a source of critique or
as a practically beneficial intervention that might render
the enterprise less "hypothetical," is likely to persist. It is
unlikely to bear fruit, because the business setting is too
inhospitable to narrative to allow it to take root in a
manner that sustains comprehensibility or interest.
Further, the "public choice" account of legislation and of the
SEC comes close to creating a story, but its effect is to blunt
the effort of regulators to sell a story of enforcement. 172
Economic analysis has just enough story to veto narratives
that link business people with allegedly bad motives to
social results.
Thus, those who rationalize corporate law with theories
that purport to capture its essence and, in recent years, to
incorporate the insights of psychology as part of a whole
account of the efficiency of corporate law, 173 might see the
claim that it lacks narrativity as both an epistemological
critique and a substantive, even ideological, claim from the
progressive wing of corporate law. The progressive
corporate law scholar might similarly see the claim as a
threat to a project that seeks to re-humanize business, or
enterprise, law. If the claim of lack of narrativity is a claim
of the irrelevance of human stories to corporate law,
arguments about "trust"'7 4 and "the human nature of
boards"'175 could seem devalued, and indeed, judged as
fruitless. 76 Narrative strategies, or, at any rate, strategies
171. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 45.
172. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60; Langevoort, supra note 60.
173. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 770 (2002) (arguing for "a model of
market and investor behavior that can be used as a lens through which to
analyze a wide variety of legal rules and policies bearing on market regulation
and corporate governance").
174. See O'Connor, supra note 121. "[T]he thesis that trust is a constitutive
element in many business relationships has been a focal point of recent
scholarship. Of particular interest is the role of trust when parties enter a
relationship in pursuit of individual economic advantage." Deborah A. Demott,
Trust and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1309-10
(1996).
175. See Langevoort, supra note 108.
176. In conferences, the claim that business and business law is thin in
narrative generates an anxiety which itself might merit examination.
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that attempt to embody the social qualifications of a purely
economic account of the corporation, would be viewed as
threatened by a claim that the very nature of the
epistemology of the corporation is resistant to such a project
of re-infusing corporate law with the material of human
psychology.
IV. THE MISSING STORY: CULTURAL EVIDENCE
A. Nineteenth-Century Literature and Twentieth-Century
Movies
The great historian Richard Hofstadter cited the
conclusion of a business journalist writing in Fortune
Magazine that "American novelists have consistently done
rank injustice to American businessmen. In the entire body
of modern American fiction, he pointed out, the business
man is almost always depicted as crass, philistine, corrupt,
predatory, domineering, reactionary, and amoral.' 1 77
Hofstadter suggested that the writer overstated one point:
the Fortune writer had argued that the novelist disliked the
business man "out of doctrine."'178 Hofstadter suggests that
''perverse intent" is not the reason for the poor showing of
businessmen in novels but instead, in the absence of a
"unitary elite," writers rarely are in a position to observe
businessmen at close quarters. He goes on to note the
uncomfortable circumstance of the intellectual, who, in
depending on patronage rather than government, "extends
one hand for the institutional largesse of dead businessmen
....,179 Unlike Larry Ribstein, who argues that the movie-
maker resents the people who are the source of capital for
the need to beg from them, 8 0 Hofstadter suggests the
intellectual class has a degree of gratitude but proceeds
177. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 233
(1963).
178. Id. at 234. David Brooks describes contemporary business leaders as
having accepted the critique and sought to become intellectual visionaries.
DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS AND How THEY GOT
THERE 117-18 (2000).
179. HOFSTADTER, supra note 177, at 236.
180. See Ribstein, Imaging Wall Street, supra note 42, at 198; see also
Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine, supra note 42, at 4, 33-36.
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with criticism of business anyway (out of lack of knowledge
of businessmen as characters and out of inclinations toward
progressivism and the like).' 8 '
Ralph Waldo Emerson, at first unable to "understand
what motivated apparently 'solid' men to risk security and
reputation in pursuit of more profits than any of them could
comfortably dispose of in a lifetime[]" eventually understood
that they resembled him, Emerson, in that "tycoons were
poets who chose to write their epics in cash."'1 2 But their
poetry is incommunicable except by the commonly shared
fascination with money; Emerson could imagine the
tycoon's acquisition of cash was poetry, although he could
not apprehend the content of the poetry.
The claim that literature and movies are hostile to
business supports the interpretation that business does not
produce narratives the culture uses to interpret business
law or the connection between individual agency and
business outcomes. If we accept Ribstein's account of the
general anti-business message of the movies, there is little
reason to credit the movie makers with having devised a
narrative that provides an accessible cultural account of the
corporate form. Ribstein acknowledges as much when he
says that the movie Wall Street was too complex for the
audience, which can more readily understand a "backstory
about war and Vietnam"'1 3 and points out that Oliver
Stone's production of Wall Street did only a third of the
business of his Vietnam movie, Platoon.8 4 Further,
Ribstein attacks the narrative competence of Stone, arguing
that the "story" in Wall Street about Gordon Gekko is an
amalgam of two figures who are entirely different corporate
players, Ivan Boesky the arbitrageur and consumer of
information, and Michael Milliken, the finance genius who
created a new form of financing to help wrest value from
moribund companies.' 8 5 Ribstein rejects the explanation
that Stone was simply looking for a villain by which to
sustain dramatic tension, using as the basis of his claim the
181. HOFSTADTER, supra note 177, at 234-36.
182. B.L. PACKER, EMERSON'S FALL: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE MAJOR
ESSAYS 96 (1982).
183. See Ribstein, Imaging Wall Street, supra note 42, at 197.
184. Id. at 197.
185. Id.
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fact that Stone did make the movie complex by introducing
nuance into Gekko's character with scenes in the "Teldar"
shareholders meeting in which he appeals to American
interest in creating sound companies and by creating a
father-son theme with Gekko's memories of his father, Bud
Fox's father, Carl the machinist, and the father-son
relationship Gekko lost with Bud, to his regret.
While Ribstein is not wrong to say the American
literary tradition, including movies, contains a strong dose
of anti-business themes, he does not suggest he has
identified a coherent narrative about business nor does he
demonstrate that Stone's motives were other than the use
of movie formulae to create dramatic tension in a setting
that interested him and that has striking images such as
the arrival of the hordes of finance industry workers on the
subway and the tech gadgets that fascinate us still. The
movie formulae requires villains, and Gekko is almost a
villain but one with a strong appeal as a male with heroic
strengths. Gekko flatters our interest in money by showing
us the energy associated with a drive to amass wealth. The
impulse in American art to portray business negatively is
present as a sort of default theme, but the movie does
rather well by business by glamorizing its energy and drive
and creating complex, intersecting story lines about human
interactions. Yet, a commanding social narrative it is not; it
is, instead, a depiction of a scene, a milieu, with the
fascination that Wall Street engenders.
To a large degree, it is about money and about
conspicuous consumption-not about business, the
securities market players, or the American corporation. As
such, it is consistent with observations throughout the
twentieth century about the marginal place of business in
the American imagination, except for the spasms of
negative portrayal of the business man in literature. A
critic of American individualism wrote in his book on the
tendency of Americans to follow the Emersonian rejection of
society for the self: "Why did industrialism have no
imaginative consequences proportionate to the profound
changes it worked?" 18 6 A later writer argued that
186. QUENTIN ANDERSON, THE IMPERIAL SELF: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
LITERARY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 244 (1971), cited in Peter Shaw, The Imperial
Self and American Literature, in EMERSON AND HIS LEGACY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
QUENTIN ANDERSON 214, 219 (Stephen Donadio et al. eds., 1986).
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nineteenth century American literature was in fact driven
by an imaginative reaction to industrialism, rendering
"[1]iterary rejections of society in that period . . . really
political protests against the dangers of incorporation."'187
As a culture, Americans look for mirrors to view a
187. Id. at 219-20 (explaining the interpretation offered by Alan
Trachenberg in THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA (1983)). Readers of the draft of
this article frequently mentioned Tom Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities as a
possible example of narrative that weaves a story about business into a
persuasive interpretation of a social milieu. The book is generally meant to be
about the effects on an individual of joining the 80's culture of Wall Street
"greed," and the effects of his encounter with the culture of poverty located in
physical proximity to his life as a "master of the universe." A quick search does
not reveal much in the way of legal citations to the novel in connection with the
corporation. Victor Fleischer cites the book as an illustration of the "surprising
stress of maintaining a wealthy lifestyle." Victor Fleischer, The Missing
Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 101 n.94 (2005). Another article compares
Enron to Bonfire: "The Enron culture is eerily reminiscent of Tom Wolfe's
fictionalized account, in which securities traders, or 'Masters of the Universe,'
produced amazing profits in a single morning." Geraldine Szott Moohr, An
Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime,
55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 965 (2003). The phrase "Masters of the Universe" attracts
citations. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM.
Bus. L.J. 417, 431 & n.69 (2003); Linda 0. Smiddy & Melissa Ihnat,
Introduction: Conference on Enron, Worldcom, and Their Aftermath, 27 VT. L.
REV. 817, 817 (2003). One law review writer suggests a confluence of New York,
sex, money, and greed. See G. Edward White, New York Faces the Millenium, 3
GREEN BAG 2D 161, 167 (2000) ("In Bonfire of the Vanities almost all of the
characters are corrupt in one fashion or another, and Wolfe invites the reader to
ask whether that corruption is one engendered by place. One possible answer is
yes: the bonfire is New York's bonfire, and the vanities center around greed.
Money, or power leading to money, or sex leading to power leading to money,
drives New York."). Many citations find something more akin to narrative
interest in the portrait of lawyers. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and
Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997 n.24 (reciting dialogue between a poor
client and her lawyer about his fee). Judge Posner has produced the only law
review article that addresses Bonfire of the Vanities as its topic. See Richard
Posner, The Depiction of Law in The Bonfire of the Vanities, 98 YALE L.J. 1653
(1989). He primarily addresses what the book has to say about law, with
virtually no attention to corporate greed. He concludes that "it is not the sort of
book that has anything interesting to say about law or any other institution."
Id. at 1655. Posner notes that the book, seen by many as having something to
say about Wall Street, has a "plot and character [that] are merely threads
connecting a series of tableaux ...." and has shallow characters that result in
part from Wolfe's misanthropy. Id. at 1658. Posner's conclusion that the book
has little to say about law may buttress a view that law is generally
inhospitable to narrative, but its treatment of an investment banker as its main
character may well help to push it toward a weak review from Judge Posner, as
he acknowledges that literature can successfully use law to explore the human
experience, or have something to say about law. See id. at 1654-55.
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reflection of their lives. Given the pervasive effect in
American society of notions of the "imperial self,"' 88
Americans analyzing their lives turn on occasion to
business as a setting for themes of the self, efforts to work
through deeply imbedded tropes affecting the American
consciousness. Hence, numerous business movies dwell on
the father-son or father-daughter relationship; Patterns is a
critical example, 8 9 as is Executive Suite.190 Boiler Room' 91
is a contemporary, perhaps derivative example. Quentin
Anderson, interestingly, argues that the father is an absent
figure in the emotional lives of key formative figures in our
national literature 92 and is absent from their portrait of
the society and the challenges of the self. That business
movies seem to have a degree of fascination with father-son
relationships hints at some sort of recovery of the father in
the context of business, or some sense that immersion in
business may accelerate a crisis about the authority of the
father and the construction of the self, but gives us little in
the way of a narrative about business. Or it simply imports
into the business setting, which emphasizes male
characters, an American concern with fathers. The Man in
the Gray Flannel Suit 93 developed a theme of the demands
of suburban and business conformity against family
connection and, as such, illustrates that business provides
one setting to explore the general tension between society
and self dating from Emerson. But, ultimately, exploring
these themes dpes not create a narrative-based social
understanding of the business culture or its legal logic.
B. Texture of Corporate Law: General Observations
With one notable exception, 194 the place of narrative in
the life and law of the business enterprise has received
188. See QUENTIN ANDERSON, THE IMPERIAL SELF (1971).
189. See PATTERNS, supra note 55.
190. EXECUTIVE SUITE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) 1954).
191. BOILER ROOM (New Line Cinema 2000).
192. ANDERSON, supra note 188, at 15-16 ("[Mlost of our major figures whom
we have come to think of as offering a sense of our distinctive qualities were
men who had either been let down by their fathers or acted as if they had.").
193. THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (20th Century Fox 1956).
194. See Rock, supra note 4.
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little attention from scholars. In literature, even a writer
who took a financier as his subject assumed that his
subject's knowledge, and thus his subject's field, is
something other than "the emotions and subtleties of
life."'195 Georg Simmel captures the erasure of personality in
business:
[A] personality [as described by Simmel] is almost completely
destroyed under the conditions of a money economy. The delivery
man, the money-lender, the worker, upon whom we are dependent,
do not operate as personalities because they enter into a
relationship only by virtue of a single activity such as the delivery
of goods, the lending of money, and because their other qualities,
which alone would give them a personality, are missing.19 6
In part, the social place of business accounts for the
unimportance of narrative in corporate law. In addition,
business attracts specialized languages that resist
translation into terms that are either usable by readers or
rendered accessible by a coherent narrative in which
recognizable characters dominate the understanding. The
fundamentals of characters, plot, and causal attribution are
under pressure in presenting an account of corporate
affairs.
Indeed, the legal treatment of the corporation
intensifies the marginal place of narrative in corporate law.
The formal rules of the corporation, implanted in state
corporate codes and given a gloss in judicial opinions,
encourage the development of roles in which opportunity to
recognize the human element is minimized. According to
Simmel, under conditions of the need for capital, "people
gain their significance for the individual concerned solely as
representatives of those functions, such as owners of capital
and suppliers of working materials."197 The business
judgment rule posits a norm of business propriety, in which
human activity is interpreted by formal assumptions about
institutional interest. Causation is elusive because
responsibility is collective and the canon of interpretation
resists a recognition of standard human motivations
195. THEODORE DREISER, THE FINANCIER 11 (revised edition 1995)
(contrasting the knowledge of a financier to that of a poet).
196. SIMMEL, supra note 67, at 295.
197. Id.
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relating to personality. The Enron morass highlighted the
cultural futility of attempting successful narratives to
account for striking business occurrences, as well as the
effect of specialized languages in frustrating readers of
corporate text.
Law and economics give a bloodless rationale for forms
of compensation that reach astronomic sums with no sense
of embodiment of the personalities involved. 198 Critics
complain that the amounts are excessive and not really tied
to performance or to a functioning market in executive
talent. Yet, until Enron, there was virtually no real portrait
of the human dynamics attendant upon lavish
compensation, either in terms of the personalities or
character of those compensated in multiples of our previous
ideas of avarice, or in term of corporate outcomes. Now, the
popular press has begun to suggest that lavish
compensation tied to the performance of a company's stock
has caused executives to become more concerned with
manipulating accounting figures than achieving actual
results. 199 Yet the sense of a vivid narrative is still not
widespread. Terms like plutocracy have recently gained
currency in occasional critiques of the business elite. Yet
there is still little that amounts to an accessible narrative
with a sweeping explanatory power. One writer, who writes
about politics and business, provides an example of the
possibility of vivid narrative that embodies a sweep. In
Wealth and Democracy, Kevin Phillips sets forth a thesis
about corporate corruption of an economic system, social
and global cycles and the international implications of an
era of corporate dominance and obsession with wealth:
"[The face of Americans], presented internationally, was the
aging visage of the leading world economic power-purple-
veined with years of high living, lips curled with the
insolence of great wealth, eyes bloodshot with the late vigils
of increasingly frequent financial crises."20 0 Without
evaluating the merits of the statement, the language
presented here is a contrast with the register of language in
which business is conducted, reported and analyzed, either
in the business press or popular writing. In Phillips's view,
198. See Carney, supra note 122.
199. See Westbrook, supra note 17.
200. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 409 (2002).
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the disappearance of terms like plutocracy is a twentieth
century phenomenon. Other writers of business, of course,
have suggested that business rarely produces figures who
attract celebration of any kind. Here I argue that the
language and conventions of business resist translation into
such vivid interpretations and the efforts to create
narrative are at best episodic and unsuccessful.
Despite the confidence that Enron would produce a
body of well-read and successful books, 2° 1 the sense of
interest wore thin quickly, as did the hopes for
comprehensibility. Ken Lay's sudden death was almost
emblematic of the frustration generated by the wish to
attach a business story to a life; efforts to embody a
business story were defeated in an instant, with no
remaining human meaning and the loss of whatever human
center a business fiasco might have had.
The lack of narrative impact is a great weakness for
which writers pay dearly in the eyes of reviewers. Further,
the academy is an unlikely source of narrative punch for an
undertaking that produces memoirs "with a deservedly
mediocre reputation. 2 02
The characteristic quest for theory and rigor encounters
a fit match in an enterprise that takes as its focal point an
abstraction incapable of emotions or rebuke. 203 That the
central figure is a fiction is no help in the search for
narrative interest. The corporation is a fiction wanting for
readers, by no means an entrant in the genre of fiction that
keeps wide-eyed readers awake at night. Ribstein
acknowledges one portion of the insight when he notes that
the Exchange Act of 1934 offers "shareholders more
information, although the Berle & Means theory would
predict shareholders would not read and could not use the
newly available information. ' 20 4 This excess of information
201. See Maggie Shiels, I Lost so Much on Enron, I Bought the Book, BBC
NEWS, Feb. 22, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1833638.stm.
202. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Life According to Jack Welch, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 2001, at W1, W12 ("Business memoirs have a deservedly mediocre
reputation .... ).
203. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of
Corporate Illegality, 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1290 n.28 (2001) (summarizing the
literature on the problem of holding corporations accountable because of their
entity nature and referring to lack of conscience).
204. Ribstein, Imaging Wall Street, supra note 42, at 168.
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does not become manageable through the efforts of movie
producers, novelists, or business journalists; we see
glimpses of the business scene and portent of drama, but
like readers of corporate documents, viewers lost the thread
of narrative except for that of the modern self at sea in
complexity. Ribstein notes that the key scene in Wall Street,
when Bud Fox sees investment bankers planning to
dismember Bluestar, is a pastiche of nonsensical takeover
argot, none of which coheres in a story about the business
logic of takeovers. It is really just a glimpse of something to
which, in some ways, none of us are privy, not even the
participants, who are at a loss to give riveting accounts of
what they do or have done. 205 While Ribstein sees it as a
piece with the artists' determination to blaspheme the
business man, 206 I find it more pungently an illustration of
an artist flailing to give a portrait of the texture of business
excitement, with no grasp at all of a story line.
C. Judicial Imagination
Business lawyers have observed that, in commercial
law cases of all sorts, judges resist the introduction of facts
about disputes,20 7 pushing the parties to resolve problems
without an involvement of the court in hearing narrative
and counter narrative. One scholar asks whether judges in
corporate cases use the business judgment rule as a means
of shirking, minimizing the need to engage in analysis of
complexity by the shorthand rule.208 He concludes that
some corporate law doctrines may be at least partly
explained by bounded rationality and incentives in judges
to shirk.20 9 By contrast to criminal law or domestic law, in
business matters, courts resist an immersion in the stories
205. See TOM WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 222-26 (1987) (scene in
which a bond trader cannot explain his job to his daughter and is mocked by his
wife).
206. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, supra note 42, at 189-90 ("Despite
these lacunae in the scenario, the sleazy atmosphere at the "carve-up" meeting,
and Bud's reaction to it, are all that is necessary to give a financially
unsophisticated audience the impression of callous greed.").
207. Interview with an anonymous business attorney, in East Lansing,
Mich. (June 2003).
208. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 254-55.
209. See id. at 256.
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of the litigants. In a curious way, the fictional person that is
a corporation, or a business, contains within it occluded
personalities and clashes of such complexity and fluidity
that skepticism about narrative, with the attendant irony
that literary criticism invites, may be the refuge of courts
that otherwise indulge the older human thirst for narrative.
However little confidence we may have in narrative, we
allow more of it to enter the courtroom, and judges are
drafted to hear more of it, and they are seduced by it
more,210 in areas outside business. Narrative is most
fascinating as an exercise in the "construction of self' that
is implicated in confession; 211 the law more readily cedes
the necessity of narrative in fields where the self is in effect
litigated than in business, where selves may abound but the
prevailing premise opposes any effort to render them
transparent or compare them for the sake of truth or
justice. 212 By contrast, in copyright, the romantic myth of
the author places the self at stake213 and implants an
implicit narrative in law. The narrative core of copyright
law is the status of the author as an owner of property
whose authorship asserts the significance of human
personality. The proprietor of intellectual property is called
an author. And an author is someone who imbues a text
with his subjectivity. Thus, authorship is an expression of
self and is imbued with subjectivity. In contrasts to a
210. See LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 3
(1996).
211. See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW &
LITERATURE 52-55 (2000).
212. The exception is the norm of "reasonable expectations" in close
corporations, in which the aspirations of an individual at the outset of an
enterprise, in terms of a role as well as economic return, is given weight in
determining the rights of participants by some state courts. See, e.g., In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984). There is considerable
criticism of the effort to reconstruct the story of a given enterprise for the
purpose of protecting non-economic, and even economic, interests. See Douglas
K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close
Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 580
(1999) ("[J]udicial efforts to explain oppression's protection of close corporation
employment in the face of the at-will doctrine have been woefully inadequate.").
But it is arguably an instance in corporate law of a strand of discourse and legal
decision-making in which legal treatment of the "self' is at stake.
213. See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity,
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 15 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
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fictional person, it naturally triggers narratives.
Criminal law seemingly provides an example of a
judicial interest in a narrative, 214 although it is one that
occurs without reference to individual characters and
guides the legal imagination of an appellate judge. It has
been argued that Chief Justice Warren created a compelling
narrative out of a record of secrecy and occlusion in his
portrait of the confession room. 215 He "create[s] a dramatic
story of the closed room, and the dramas of humiliation,
deception, and coercion played out behind the locked
door. '216 The portrayal of the confession room is a
compelling narrative because it has an implicit character
and a sense of immediacy. One can feel the emotion of being
trapped in a confession room. The room even has the
quality of a stage.
The boardroom may have such a quality; several movies
use the board room as an emblematic setting for power. The
cinematic boardroom has tall windows akin to cathedral
windows-stylized board rooms are seen in Patterns,
Executive Suite, and The Hudsucker Proxy.217 Yet the
human imagination is stymied in giving the characters a
sense of embodiment. They stand in the board room,
dressed for drama, but in our imagination, they are
shadowy figures set to speak hidden lines. They clash but
the human meaning of the contest and the result is veiled.
The exaggerated presentation of the board room in Patterns
and in The Hudsucker Proxy seems to suggest that the
corporation dwarfs the human personality (as of course does
Chaplin's classic silent movie Modern Times21s using the
spectre of mechanization in business). In many
advertisements, business meetings in conference rooms are
214. For a treatment of juror interest in narrative in criminal cases, see
John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a
Story, Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a
Defense (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-042, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=942653. For a careful treatment of the function of
narrative in trials, see Robert P. Burns, The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative
(Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 04-07), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=595143.
215. See BROOKS, supra note 211, at 14.
216. Id. at 13.
217. THE HUDSUCKER PROXY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1994).
218. MODERN TIMES (Charles Chaplin Productions 1936).
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filled with absurd people, grasping for small economies and
little victories over their peers. Business is absurd. Larry
Ribstein might maintain this lends credence to his
argument that movies portray business as bad, but it more
of a depiction of the futility of telling an understandable
story in human scale about the production of wealth. Is a
depiction of the banality of business interactions a
narrative? Seemingly, it is a single-premise joke about the
culture-not a narrative about the corporation but one
about one-upmanship and forms of detachment from group
undertakings. And, we are told by some business
practitioners, judges do not want to hear it.
By contrast, even without characters who say and do
things, the fact of characters and of characteristic speech is
palpable in Warren's image. The narrative is compelling,
because it has an idea of particularity shared with an
emblematic quality of a universal plight that embodied
persons can imagine.
D. Corporate Biography
It is perhaps only to be expected that corporate law is
no more concerned with business leaders than is general
literature or popular or other academic interest. The efforts
to record the lives of business men often seem to yield little
of enduring interest or narrative quality. A slight volume,
self-published by a business man about a fifty-year business
career in reinsurance in London in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, yields the thinnest of social history
or linkage of persons and their habits and opinions to
business practice. 219  Thicker volumes about the
personalities in large corporate fortunes or in recent
corporate battles contain richer detail and fewer bromides
than the self-reporting of the business man of earlier days,
but may often overwhelm with information that is difficult
to organize. 220 Books about businesses strain to acquire
219. EDWIN JOHN SPENCER, RECOLLECTIONS OF My BUSINESS LIFE 57 (1927)
(self published, concluding that "I seldom won by being cleverer than others,
but by trying harder").
220. Tad Friend, Mickey Mouse Club: Playing by Michael Eisner's Rules,
THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 24/May 2, 2000, at 212 (generally favorable review of
book by Kim Masters about executive personalities at Disney, but with
reference to "thorough but frequently unsifted reporting").
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narrative thrust but often fail. 221 Indeed, even those who
have been credited with generating interesting narratives
about business have asserted that periods pass without the
production of interesting narrative about business. 222 It is
further suggested that writing about business has limited
appeal. 223 And as noted, a real-life business disaster, rife
221. A book on the Schwinn bicycle company was reviewed as coming "[t]oo
much . . .in the uninspired prose of the business pages." The authors of the
book strained to tell Schwinn's story "as a full-dress industrial epic," but
"[slometimes a bike is just a bike." Fred Andrews, It's a Schwinn: A History of
the Company That Before its Decline was the Nation's Premier Bike Maker, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Dec. 1, 1996, at 25. (reviewing JUDITH CROWN & GLENN
COLEMAN, No HANDS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SCHWINN BICYCLE COMPANY, AN
AMERICAN INSTITUTION (1996)). It seems significant that the statement
"sometimes a bike is just a bike" rings true when a bicycle is viewed as the
primary focus of a business enterprise and not when it is seen as a memory of
Christmas or poverty in post-War Italy. The movie THE BICYCLE THIEF
(Produzioni De Sica 1948) demonstrates that a bicycle could be the fulcrum of a
narrative of personal calamity. A review in The New York Times of a book that
sought to portray a fascinating relationship between business journalists and
chief executive officers as a "kind of cult figure" struggles to find words
sufficient to denounce the book for its narrative failure. The book uses "movie-
music portent ... to cover over the essentially repetitive, even monotonous
quality to [the] story," the author "never manages to give much shape to many
stories he tells," the author has "confounded the verbal style of his subjects with
effective, lively narrative prose," the characters, even where interesting, do not
"substantiate the overall thesis of [the] book," which is that moving markets is
easy, the author "gives us a great heap of... personalities, but he does not sort
very carefully through his own material for some clear conclusions," as to his
characters emotions, "Who cares? one wants to aska", and the "narrative
approach . . . fails to pick up much thematic momentum ....... Richard
Bernstein, Hear All About It: The New Business Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2000, at B6 (reviewing HOWARD KURTZ, THE FORTUNE TELLERS: INSIDE WALL
STREET'S GAME OF MONEY, MEDIA AND MANIPULATION (2000)). The interest in
Jack Welch's biography was accompanied by disclaimers about the usual
interest that can be generated by business biography. See, e.g., Holman W.
Jenkins Jr., Life According to Jack Welch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2001, at W1,
W12 ("Business memoirs have a deservedly mediocre reputation ....").
222. See Bryan Burrough, Fox in the Henhouse: Two Books Examine the
Scandals at Archer Daniels Midland and the Man Who Blew the Whistle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 12 (reviewing KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A
TRUE STORY (2000) and JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS
AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DAVID MIDLAND (2000)) ("[T]he last few years have not
produced an abundance of memorable nonfiction narratives set in corporate
America. Among those who have attempted the genre, there's been some debate
why. It's true the world of balance sheets and stock charts hasn't exactly been a
magnet for the most creative and inspired writers of this generation.").
223. See id. ("[T]here's also a sense that the genre itself may be limited; once
readers have embraced one good book on an uproarious takeover battle, a
vicious proxy fight, a tale of Hollywood excess, a high-tech startup or an insider-
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with candidates to be villains, generally fails to generate
sustained cultural attention and is judged wanting as a
story by observers as "a dull business story. ' 224 The
possibility that a female cultural figure who is also a CEO
may have strayed over the line of trading propriety is seen
as a peg on which to hang a reaction otherwise lacking a
focal point or comprehensibility. 225 Moreover, the argument
is made that there is a propensity to choose female villains
not even part of the business scandal rather than indulge in
hating male protagonists in business frauds, 226 perhaps
because the males, as functional components of the
business machine, cannot carry the burden of narrative.
The impossibility of using gender within the corporation to
account for a story line is made poignant in the effort to
introduce comprehensibility by elevating marginal female
players as emblematic villains.
The link between business and people is sought to be
preserved in a quaint volume, Corporate Eponymy: A
Biographical Dictionary of the Persons Behind the Names of
Major American, British, European and Asian
Businesses.227 The effort to link firm names to their
trading scandal, it hasn't been shown that they're left hungering for more.").
Reviews of books about corporate decision-making often remark on the failure
of the book as a coherent account of anything. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Millions
for Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at 10 (remarking of Ken Auletta's book on
the Microsoft antitrust trial that "little of it is engaging as narrative or valuable
as commentary" and that Auletta "leaves it to the reader to make sense of a
mountain of jumbled facts and impressions"); see also HOWARD KURTZ, THE
FORTUNE TELLERS: INSIDE WALL STREET'S GAME OF MONEY, MEDIA AND
MANIPULATION (2000); DALE ARTHUR OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 427 (1999) (describing Barbarians at the Gate as "a rather bad
HBO movie"). It is interesting by contrast that the compelling narratives about
corporate wrongdoing tend to be from genres that sound in tort or criminality
and lend themselves to the detective format. See, e.g., ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey
Films 2000); THE INSIDER (Touchstone Pictures 1999).
224. Randall Patterson, Houston Does Not Believe in Tears, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 82, 86 (quoting the Houston Post gossip
columnist).
225. See Leslie Savan, In Defense of Martha, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at
A29 ("Martha Stewart is above all an individual, and it's always easier to focus
on individuals rather than corporations.")
226. See id. (arguing that we don't love to hate Kenneth Lay from Enron or
Dennis Kozlowski from Tyco, rather focusing our "love-to-hate paroxysm" on
Kenneth Lay's wife for saying she and her husband had "lost everything").
227. ADRIAN ROOM, CORPORATE EPONYMY: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
THE PERSONS BEHIND THE NAMES OF MAJOR AMERICAN, BRITISH, EUROPEAN AND
604 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
founders is pleasantly quixotic, the product an elegant little
book that is difficult to classify. In noting the difficulties of
research, the author describes a protypical reaction to
inquiries about the provenance of a firm name: 'If you find
out anything about him, let us know,' was the reaction of
one well known firm when cheerfully admitting they had no
information of any kind of their founder. 2 28
The son of the founder of Kresge protested when Kresge
became K-Mart, saying that 'the company name should
relate to the founder.' ' 229 The vote by shareholders was 89.4
million to 11.3 million,230 thus confirming a widespread
cultural predisposition to treat corporate identity as
corporate, or anyway to yield to business preference for
depersonalization, 231 little needful of a link to a family, and
implicitly social and regional, narrative.
There are, of course, counter examples provided by the
perennial cultural fascination with money. According to
Maureen Dowd, one of our more insightful cultural
observers, "[t]he sexiest thing in America is no longer sex.
It's money. ' 232 Reacting to the payment of a record book
ASIAN BUSINESSES (1992).
228. Id. at x.
229. Id. at 138 (quoting Stanley Kresge). Family members of founders
frequently make a fuss of retaining the family name in the face of corporate
bureaucratization. Nancy Reynolds, in the decade before R.J. Reynolds became
a pawn in the debt-fueled restructuring of corporations, "fought a proposal to
take 'Reynolds' out of the company name, writing letters to board members that
said, in effect, 'Over my dead body."' BURROUGHS & HELYAR, supra note 76, at
283. Given the future of the company as the battle ground of mobs of strangers
and as a proving ground for ownership of techniques of finance and approaches
to reconfiguring business assets, an effort to preserve a family name appears
retrospectively to be a futile stab at preserving a narrative that could not stand
against the power of a financial logic applied to assets, not stories.
230. ROOM, supra note 227, at 227.
231. The narrative of corporate law reminds us that the shareholder vote
reflects passive compliance with board recommendation rather than active
monitoring. To support a proposal that shares be severed from control and only
entitle holders to investment return, Peter Drucker early on drew on the
narrative of shareholder passivity to advocate recognizing the "de facto
situation" that rights of control associated with shares are fictional and, in his
view, unjustified. DRUCKER, supra note 128, at 340-41.
232. Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., Liberties: The $7 Million Man, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2000, § 4, at 15; see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 23
(2000) (arguing that feelings about "amassing substantial and quick riches ...
have transformed our culture into one that reveres the successful
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advance of $7.1 million to Jack Welch, the celebrated CEO
of General Electric, Dowd talks about the "literature of
lucre, the Bildungsroman 233 of the bottom line. ' 234 But
businessmen do not write about money as much as they do
about the art of leadership. When contemporary
businesspeople undertake to write about business, they
take as their subject the generalized concept of leadership.
A search for books about business movies turned up several
books that purport to derive lessons for doing business, or
for leadership, from various movies. 235
Plainly, the culture periodically looks to celebrated
business men as sources of possible insight or inspiration
and even makes of them a sometimes celebrity. Lee Iacocca,
Bill Gates, Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller, 23 6 J.P. Morgan,
or Andrew Carnegie command interest, but the extent to
which the interest produces engaging narratives about
business that helps explain business law or even business
logic is minimal. There is no singular narrative that gives
these business figures embodiment as an exemplar of
business practices or meanings. Even more sharply, there is
no readily comprehensible link between narratives about
founders of fortunes to the legal outcomes in business law.
businessperson as much as or even more than the accomplished scientist, artist,
or revolutionary").
233. It should be noted that the term "Bildungsroman," applied to the
manager of a corporation, is suffused with irony and mockery. Bildungsroman
refers to a novel of formation about a protagonist, often an artist, who
undergoes a spiritual crisis. See ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 193. The anomaly of
applying the term to a work by a business executive demonstrates that, even
when business and money are being praised, or sent up as "sexy," the
background assumption is that they are not the stuff of literature and, thus, a
culture that elevates businesspeople to be objects of something akin to literary
interest is auditioning account books as a replacement for real literary forms.
The likelihood of success is low, and so understood.
234. Dowd, supra note 232, at 15.
235. See, e.g., JOHN K. CLEMENS & MELORA WOLFF, MOVIES TO MANAGE BY:
LESSONS IN LEADERSHIP FROM GREAT FILMS (1999); STEPEHEN DENNING, THE
LEADER'S GUIDE TO STORYTELLING: MASTERING THE ART OF AND DISCIPLINE OF
BUSINESS NARRATIVE (2005); SHAUN O'L HIGGINS ET AL., MOVIES FOR BUSINESS:
BIG-SCREEN LESSONS IN CORPORATE VISION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, LOGISTICS AND
ETHICS (2003); SHAUN O'L HIGGINS & COLLEEN STRIEGEL, MOVIES FOR LEADERS:
MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM FOUR ALL-TIME GREAT FILMS (1999).
236. John D. Rockefeller's renown was such that a major author turned to
him for the name of a novel. See Nathanael West, A Cool Million, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF NATHANAEL WEST 142 (1957) ("John D. Rockefeller would
give a cool million to have a stomach like yours.").
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E. Money.
The money well-known businessmen earn commands
attention. But an interest in the possession of money does
not sustain interest in business. Desire for money does not
portend an obsession with the details of its generation.
Indeed, part of money's magic is its self-generation, its
velocity and expansion.237 As such, money is well studied as
a source of fascination and, in the terms of literary theory,
mystification. 238 In addition, money can be seen as having a
literary quality, in that it arises from the same medium
that confers belief in literature. 239 Grand theorists have
said that the story of culture is also the "story of money. 240
But the principal site for the generation of wealth in the
modern culture, i.e., the corporation, evades claims about
narrative, which theorists about money associate with the
nation-state,241  and spiritual magic, which theorists
237. See PATRICK BRANTLINGER, FICTIONS OF STATE: CULTURE AND CREDIT IN
BRITAIN, 1694-1994 26 (1996) (citing HANS BINSWANGER, MONEY AND MAGIC: A
CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN ECONOMY IN THE LIGHT OF GOETHE'S FAUST (J.E.
Harrison trans., 1994)); see also David Brooks, Why the U.S. Will Always Be
Rich, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 88 ("We keep sprouting
money....").
238. George Simmel described money as a "universal representative and
solvent of all values" that becomes itself of spiritual significance. BRANTLINGER,
supra note 237, at 23; see also id. ("[M]oney is involved in the general
development which in every domain of life and in every sense strives to dissolve
substance into free-floating processes." (quoting SIMMEL, supra note 67 at 16)).
Ralph Waldo Emerson is described as having "had faith that, properly
employed, money is, 'in its effects and laws, as beautiful as roses . . . ." Wesley
T. Mott, The Age of the First Person Singular: Emerson and Individualism, in A
HISTORICAL GUIDE TO RALPH WALDO EMERSON 78 (Joel Myerson ed., 2000) (citing
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 136 (Alfred R. Ferguson,
Joseph Slater & Douglas Emory Wilson eds., 1971)).
239. See BRANTLINGER, supra note 237, at 24 (quoting MARK SHELL, MONEY,
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT: LITERACY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ECONOMICS FROM THE
MEDIEVAL TO THE MODERN ERA 7 (1982)).
240. Id. (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, GIVEN TIME: I. COUNTERFEIT MONEY 129
(1992)); see also Michael Gross, This Gore's No Bore, GEORGE, Oct. 2000, at 91
(quoting Gore Vidal asserting that General Motors, General Electric, and other
corporations "decide the sort of lives we lead and what we eat and drink and
think" because "[t]he greatest ideology in America is greed").
241. See BRANTLINGER, supra note 237, at 10 ("Nation-states produce a
variety of more or less official narratives, or forms of national representation, to
create and sustain their legitimation.").
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associate with money and economic growth.242 Rather, the
corporation is "vertiginously complex, electronic, and
hypothetical. '243 It is more akin to an idea than to a story,
or anyway, its complexity and its fluidity do not readily
offer interpretations that analogize to literary artifacts.
The principal character in the story of corporate law is
capital, its imperatives and its power to alter cultures and
create wealth. The plot is change of such daily mass as to
defy a chronicle. The human element recedes in the face of
the story of money, 244 even where we know that human
dramas and personal motives may abound. So they do. But
they are not what the field concerns itself with. That
human stories lack point in business law is neither good nor
bad. It is simply the way it is.
The observation nonetheless has an element of irony:
the moral imperative of the corporate enterprise is not
demonstrable, reasons for ironic distance abound. Yet, the
corporation is a site where narrative recedes as the
attachment to wealth generation and its nourishment of the
spirit provides the occasion for activities that lend
themselves to a non-narrative epistemology. Narrative loses
out both as a conveyor of legitimacy and as critique. The
corporation is a place where lives are located but narrative
imagination about them loses point. Narrative interest is
transferred from the getting to the spending of money.
There have been substantial narrative projects in other
fields. With one exception, 245 corporate scholarship has had
no such movement. With only preliminary investigation,
one is struck that work in corporate law does not gravitate
242. See id. at 26 (citing BINSWANGER, supra note 237).
243. BRANTLINGER, supra note 237, at 24.
244. Indeed, a review of a novel billed as a legal thriller concludes that the
author is unable to develop any aspect of the story, given the grip on his
imagination of a pile of cash in the sum of $3,118,000. According to the
reviewer:
The cash at [the work's] center has emboldened Grisham to dispense
with all of the other anxieties of authorship. The money displaces
character and narrative, tension and resolution. Everyone in the book
talks and thinks about little else .... The money is the most engaging
character in the book, the most fully developed, the most lifelike.
Adam Liptak, Take the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 13 (reviewing JOHN
GRISHAM, THE SUMMONS (2002)).
245. See Rock, supra note 4.
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to narrative; there is no inclination to examine corporate
law as a series of narratives, nor is there any salient
movement to reform corporate law by the infusion into it of
narratives to counter prevailing narratives. The work in
corporate law pits theories against theories. In addition, as
will be discussed further, other fields, as a matter of legal
practice, generate lawyers whose gift is the construction of
a persuasive narrative. The corporate calling for lawyers is
not thought about as a storytelling craft in the same way as
the criminal lawyer's work. The delegitimation and
disruption of nascent narratives about corporate authority
or plot lines and characters within the corporation is more
characteristically the calling of the corporate lawyer.
Perhaps the corporate lawyer should understand narrative,
but not for the purpose of becoming a narrator of the
corporation.
CONCLUSION
The abstract models that have gained prominence in
corporate law have a relentless capacity to displace
narrative as a source of cultural power, to disrupt critical
narratives, and to generate powerful rationales for
mainstream corporate law. The resistance of the
predominant model to "progressive" critique is no surprise,
given the power of the abstraction, the factually marginal
status of narrative, and the capacity of corporate law for
bracketing narratives of all kinds. To the extent the power
of the governing framework draws on any "meta-narrative,"
it is a sweeping story about the critical importance of
change and the relative unimportance of who said what and
why.
The absence of narrative from corporate law could be
seen as the diagnosis of a problem, or, alternatively, might
be thought a virtue of a body of law that addresses the
affairs of people whose involvement in various of the
favorite subjects of narrative, such as greed, betrayal,
loyalty, the search for and the use of power, and the
creation and expansion of enterprises that alter daily life,
are only incidental to the enterprise logic. The law of
corporations supplants morality tales with authoritative
outcomes based on organizational logic. The law reinforces
the cultural indisposition to generate narratives about
business that provide a general understanding of the
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corporate enterprise. The law cannot generate stories that
the culture lacks.
Efforts to undermine the heavily economic approach to
corporate law as a nexus of contracts and the narrow focus
of the predominating model of corporate law as having to do
mainly with the relation between management and
shareholders have an implicit aspiration to social narrative
not captured by economic logic. The argument is that a
contract view, coupled with a goal of profit maximization,
creates a narrative void. A communitarian approach brings
to the surface the elements of narrative. Specifically, a
communitarian corporate law draws upon concrete
characters in specific companies (labor), textured settings (a
local community), chronology (the creation of the enterprise
and the promises of management to the community and the
counter promises of labor and the community), and effects
of managerial decisions on their friends and neighbors. The
attempt to critique the body of corporate law, in some ways,
appears to be an effort to inject narrative into the
enterprise and thereby cement the economic arrangements
with affective social bonds given imaginative power by the
force of a story anchored to people with personal ties to the
corporation. The dissatisfaction with treating labor as a
separate body of law must be seen in certain respects as an
insistence on the narrative relating to the role labor plays
in the history of any enterprise and the dialogue that is
created between management, shareholders, labor, and the
community.
The absence of reading is a comment on both the reader
and the corporate text. The absence of reading is a
commonplace: "Nobody seriously expects boards to read
merger agreements cover to cover .... 246 Also wanting for
readers are the routine texts of the corporation: bonds,
articles of incorporation, most of proxy statements. Lawyers
pore over them, not to absorb text about any given
corporation, but to master the art of writing them-they are
a text written to be re-written in forms of copying that
require both meticulous imitation and studied departures
by lawyers both tied to rote and alert for nuance. The
keepers of corporate text read them in the act of writing
them. If the texts were to be read by readers not working to
246. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 60, at 280.
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reproduce them in the act of reading them, literally re-
presenting disparate aspects of the corporation, or
constituency, the reader would be reminded of the cobbled-
together nature of the company by the effort to absorb the
whole of a text. The corporate body requires, or at least
benefits from, the fact that its texts are unread. Enron
became the ultimate example of text not created for
readers. Nobody could read all the texts. Law firms with
dozens of associates and unlimited resources, in the Powers
report, admitted to only scratching the surface. Enron was
the perfected corporate text, a text beyond reading. In the
shredding, and in the reaction to the shredding of some
portion of it, the shredders and the prosecutors flatter us all
and serve as collaborators in a structure of belief we need.
The destruction, and the outrage, are tributes required for
us to believe corporate text is a means of communication.
Characterizing the narrative content of both corporate
law and corporate conventions of speech and operational
text is, to be sure, no small task. It implies a comparison of
corporate "talk" to the talk that adheres to other legal
phenomena. It implies comprehensive classification of the
body of material attached to corporate law for its "literary"
form. It raises the question of the intellectual approach of
those who are involved in corporate scholarship and the
sources of raw material for speech by those in the
corporation or writing about it in the popular press. As
such, the claim is readily disputed and critiqued.
I am open to conclusions about the significance of the
lack of narrative: I reject the assumption, tending to come
from the left, that narrative is needed to give voice to the
interests of different constituencies or to incorporate
"outsider voice." Rather, narrative can have no other
purpose than capturing the texture of a world. Narrative
could celebrate the corporation as well as critique it.247
247. Efforts to provide narrative accounts of major businesses tend to
contain some celebratory element about the industrialists who have helped
build major corporations, even where accompanied by a critique. See generally
JOHN A. BYRNE, THE WHIZ KIDS: THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
AND THE LEGACY THEY LEFT US (1993) (attributing vast influence to the Ford
Motor Company "whiz kids" but also suggesting that their genius for cutting
costs and establishing control damaged product quality, customer satisfaction,
and individual initiative). The governance of the corporation as envisioned in
corporate law-the role of the board, the passive nature of stockholding-eludes
either critique or celebration in narrative treatments of our major corporations.
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Narrative has no message until someone creates it. For the
corporation, its creation is unlikely. If this observation is a
critique, at best it is a critique of the getting and spending
of money, a complaint long known to the western world but
not one well aimed at the shape of corporate law.
Thus, the examination of the disjunction between
narrative and both the activities of business and the
content of corporate law does not yield any firm prescription
about the corporation or the economy. The implications
depend upon the perspective of the reader. An implication
for the business man, the corporate lawyer, or the corporate
scholar may well be that business enterprise has a
distinctive logic that makes efforts at global critique beside
the point. The point of business is efficiency, whether in the
service of shareholders in the corporation, the
entrepreneur, or the wealth of the society. The claim
underpins the calling of all those with a practical or
rationalizing bent, affirming that business is about money.
The study of the corporation and of the law of the
corporation is for the purpose of maintaining its soundness
as an economic engine that functions within the
assumptions of a political system.248 On the other hand, the
implication of the observation that corporate law does not
generate narrative for some students of the corporation
might be a pressing need to find entry points for
intervention in its discourses, to enrich the legal and
business language that guides managers, judges, and
scholars. Here, the emphasis is on the importance of
language for one's ethical and even spiritual welfare. There
is less overt concern with money and more with the
aspirations of being a human being, with human
understandings that find expression in narrative and with
abiding recognition of language as a medium in which
248. For a recent restatement of that view, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate Governance: A Comment
on Strine 3 (May 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=985683 (arguing that "it would be a
serious error to view the corporation. . . in communal terms," as there is only a
lowest common denominator of values among the diverse groups whose
interests are affected by the corporation); see also D. Gordon Smith, The
Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law 9 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=976742 (arguing that changes in corporate governance giving
greater input to non-shareholder constituencies does not, and cannot, alter the
profit- maximizing incentives of corporate managers).
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honor and integrity are transmitted and maintained. 249 Still
others would perceive the lack of narrative as a deep
critique of the corporation and favor transformation of the
corporation in the service of social and economic justice. 250
Others analyze the language of the corporation as a form of
social control, an intentional masking of power, and even as
a master narrative that justifies the form political power
assumes. One such writer calls for a re-imagining of the
corporation through the creation of a master narrative that
disables the mythical stature of corporate law and
challenges its priests and servants 251 to defend their claims
about the corporation from deconstruction of its symbols
and meanings. The likelihood of such a turn in the
discourse about business and business form is minimal,
particularly given the thesis presented here that business,
and indeed the money economy, does not foster narrative.
One is presumably left with a view that the corporation is
not a project for narrators or for poets but for technocratic
mastery. Yet human beings reside in the corporation and
will try to find a place in it for the language they speak
about themselves. They deserve support, but it is unclear
who can provide it, or, indeed, if anyone has the
imagination to supply more than a few evanescent
vignettes.
249. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27 (2003) (arguing for an affirmative
duty of loyalty that draws on literary and religious stories).
250. See Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law (Apr. 3,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=978242 (arguing for changing corporate law to make
corporations a progressive force that both creates wealth and spreads it more
equitably).
251. See Litowitz, supra note 71, at 535.
